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Abstract
Impaired self-awareness (ISA) of deficit has far-reaching and potentially catastrophic
consequences to stroke survivors. Previous research suggests that self-awareness greatly
depends on the context or nature of the task. One of the most potentially dangerous
consequences of ISA manifests when stroke survivors attempt to resume driving
prematurely. Despite these potential dangers, very little research has examined the
manifestations o f ISA and driving. The present study examined the self-awareness of
driving simulator and neuropsychological performance among stroke patients, comparing
them to healthy control participants. Thirty stroke survivors and 30 controls were each
asked for prediction and postdiction ratings of their performance on various driving
simulator and neuropsychological tasks. Self-estimates versus actual performance
discrepancy scores were calculated for various simulator and neuropsychological
measures. The results indicate that across all measures, the stroke survivors greatly
overestimated their performance in comparison to the accuracy o f self-evaluations among
the controls, thus suggesting impaired self-awareness. This pattern of overestimating was
observed on both novel (neuropsychological) and familiar (driving) tasks. However, there
was some evidence to suggest that stroke survivors can benefit from feedback, as seen by
increased accuracy in postdiction versus prediction self-evaluation scores. Additionally,
both stroke survivors and controls showed greater shift toward accurate self-estimation on
postdiction o f driving performance than on postdiction of neuropsychological test
performance. Although the temporal stability of the shift in awareness is not known, these
results support the use of driving simulators as a useful and safe method o f assessing and
potentially improving stroke survivors’ ISA.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Stroke is the fourth leading cause of death in Canada; each year, between 40 000
to 50 000 Canadians will suffer a stroke, resulting in approximately 16 000 deaths per
year (Heart and Stroke Foundation of Canada, 2002). As a result of stroke, individuals
may experience short-term and permanent impairments in many domains, including
cognition, emotion, social interaction, and general behaviour. However, many stroke
survivors experience significant limitations in their self-awareness of these deficits, a
pattern that can greatly hinder their activities of daily living and independence, including
driving. The purpose of this study is to examine stroke survivors’ self-awareness of
driving ability as measured by the discrepancies between actual and estimated
performance on a driving simulator task.
The probability of a stroke survivor returning to driving ranges from 30% to 75%
(Mazer, Gelinas, & Benoit, 2004). In the event of driving cessation, stroke survivors
experience a 42% decline in health-related quality of life (Poissant, Mayo, WoodDauphinee, & Clarke, 2004) which may be attributable to increased frequency of
depression, less access to community activities, and limited ability to socialize (Mazer et
al., 2004). Due to the large number of Canadians impacted by stroke and the potentially
widespread consequences of driving cessation, accurate identification and effective
retraining of driving abilities are of the utmost importance in this population. In order to
do so one must understand the many facets of driving ability, how they are impacted by
stroke, and the measures that can be implemented to help retrain individuals. O f these
factors, one o f the most important is self-awareness of deficit as it affects the implications
o f the distinct cognitive and physical disorders, as well as an individual’s approach to
rehabilitation methods.
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In terms of driving resumption, there needs to be a balance between encouraging
the return to functional independence and public safety. Although there are currently
numerous avenues of assessment aimed at determining one’s fitness to drive, one of the
primary factors remains the individual’s decision itself. In theory, the decision to return to
driving is a complicated and multidimensional task that includes the ability to evaluate
the demands of the task accurately in the context of one’s ability to manage those
demands. This evaluative process must occur in cognitive, emotional, and physical
domains and requires accurate self-evaluation. Unfortunately, following
neuropsychological deficits, such as those following stroke, an individual’s selfevaluation of his/her functioning in these areas is often compromised (Prigatano &
Klonoff, 1998). Therefore, it is important for clinicians to be aware of clients’ selfevaluation process and how it occurs in the context of driving resumption.
The present study will investigate self-evaluation of driving performance in stroke
patients. This introduction will be divided into two primary chapters. The first chapter
will discuss the construct of self-awareness, including a discussion of general theories,
methods of measurement, and its relationship to different domains and skills. The second
chapter will then turn to a description of the literature pertaining to stroke and driving
ability. This chapter will contain a discussion of general theories of normal driving
ability, the clinical manifestations of driving deficits in stroke patients, self-evaluation of
driving abilities, and the recent use of driving simulators as a possible procedure for
improving self-awareness in stroke patients.
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Impaired Self-Awareness
Definition of ISA
ISA can have devastating effects on an individual’s ability to manage their
environment effectively. In fact, self-awareness has been viewed as the highest form of
brain activity that mediates and interacts with other brain processes (Stuss, 1991). In a
clinical setting, ISA can result in lack of motivation to participate in rehabilitation,
unwillingness to use assistive/compensatory devices, the decision to leave treatment
prematurely, and poor choices regarding community integration. This can subsequently
lead to vocational choices that exceed ability, which may result in safety risks and
increased probability of long-term psychological problems. In fact, self-awareness has
been identified as a powerful predictor of vocational success (Sherer, Bergloff et al.,
1998) and rehabilitation outcome (Sherer, Boake et al., 1998). A recent review of the
literature pertaining to rehabilitation outcome following acquired brain injury revealed
that 10 of 12 empirical studies indicated a strong positive correlation between selfawareness of deficit and rehabilitation outcome (Ownsworth & Clare, 2006). At the other
end of the spectrum, self-awareness has been found to predict behavioural disturbance in
acquired and traumatic brain injury independent of cognitive and executive function
(Bach & David, 2006). Most relevant to the current study, self-awareness also plays an
essential role in self-judgment regarding fitness to drive (Coleman et al., 2002; Scott et
al., 2007).
Within research, a variety of terms have been used to describe ISA, including lack
o f insight, anosognosia, and neglect, as well as terms such as denial, eutonia, indifference,
and metacognition. Unfortunately, the true definitions of these terms do not allow for
interchangeable use. For instance, although both denial and anosognosia involve the
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denial of deficits, the underlying mechanisms are different (i.e., denial reflects a defense
mechanism to alleviate emotional upset whereas anosognosia represents a lack of
awareness likely caused by brain damage). Therefore, it is important to properly define
the terminology and distinguish between concepts. The terms unawareness and
anosognosia (literally meaning “without knowledge of disease”) are often used
interchangeably in the literature (Hartmann-Maeir, Soroker, Oman, & Katz, 2003).
Babinski (1914; as cited in Vuilleumier, 2004) first coined the term “anosognosia” to
describe an individual’s lack of knowledge, awareness, or recognition of their physical
disease. By definition, anosognosia occurs in “patients with neurological impairments
who appear unable to notice and acknowledge the existence of deficits, often despite
blatant evidence for the handicap (e.g., hemiplegia)” (Vuilleumier, 2004, p. 9). Selfawareness has been defined as “the capacity to perceive the ‘self in relatively ‘objective’
terms whilst maintaining a sense of subjectivity” (Prigatano, & Schacter, 1991, p. 13). It
involves the “interaction between thoughts (i.e., knowledge of the situation in an
objective sense) and feelings (i.e., appreciation or unique interpretation of situation in a
subjective sense)” (Prigatano & Schacter, 1991, p. 13). Conversely, ISA reflects “an
impairment in the patient’s ability to consciously represent (perceive and experience) a
disturbance in higher cerebral functioning- a disruption in the integration of thinking and
feeling” (Prigatano & Klonoff, 1998, p. 57). For the purposes of this study, the terms
anosognosia, unawareness of deficit, and ISA will be used interchangeably to
communicate this concept.
In the context of stroke, ISA is noted most frequently in the most severe form:
hemineglect. Hemineglect (particularly in terms of unawareness for hemiplegia) is also
one of the most common manifestations of ISA in stroke populations as it occurs in 20 to
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30% of the stroke population (Vuilleumier, 2004). Initial studies on awareness after
stroke addressed this striking phenomenon of unawareness of paralysis, particularly in
right-hemisphere damage (Hartmann-Maeir, Soroker, Ring, & Katz, 2002). Since then,
there has been some debate as to whether self-awareness of deficit shows consistent
lateralization. Some researchers have shown that it occurs at higher rates in individuals
who suffer right-sided strokes (Anderson & Tranel, 1989; Hartmann-Maeir et al., 2002)
whereas others have failed to find a consistent lateralization pattern (Hartmann-Maeir et
al, 2003; Hibbard, Gordon, Stein, Grober, & Sliwinski, 1992). Regardless of
lateralization, ISA of deficit constitutes a significant problem in stroke patients, not only
in terms of the severe forms such as hemineglect, but also in its more subtle aspects, for
example, ignorance of cognitive, physical, and emotional deficits. In fact, the incidence of
ISA in stroke populations has been reported to be as high as 39 to 50% (Hartmann-Maeir
et al., 2002; Wagner & Cushman, 1989) and in one study, 30% of the sample did not
spontaneously acknowledge having a stroke at all (Hartmann-Maeir et al., 2002).
Theories of ISA
Numerous theories have proposed possible mechanisms or factors involved in
self-awareness. Fleming and Strong (1995) discussed three levels of self-awareness: 1)
knowledge of deficits; 2) functional implications of the deficits; and 3) realistic
expectations in predicting performance. Flashman and colleagues (Flashman, Amador, &
McAllister, 1998) expanded upon this theory by proposing similar cognitive dimensions
(i.e., knowledge of deficit and ability to comprehend impact of deficit on daily life) and
by also including the emotional response to the deficit (i.e., anger, denial, apathy) as a
critical dimension related to self-awareness. Similarly, Allen and Ruff (1990)
distinguished between psychological and neuropsychological/cognitive factors among
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three levels of processing that they believed influenced the accuracy of a patient’s selfreporting. The first level, termed awareness, requires the ability to attend to, encode, and
retrieve information in relation to one’s self; neuropsychological factors mostly affect this
level. Appraisal, the second level, occurs when the patient compares information about
the current self with premorbid self-evaluations, a process mediated by both emotional
and cognitive functioning. Finally, disclosure is the willingness to report one’s self
perception to another person or clinician, again a process mediated by both cognitive and
emotional factors.
Many other potential mechanisms have been proposed since the inception of these
general theories. There are emotional and motivational theories pertaining to inaccurate
self-evaluation. ISA may involve a deficient affective drive that inhibits a person’s ability
to respond to uncertainties about current bodily states or cognitive abilities or leads to
lessened emotional impact of perceived or supposed failure (Vuilleumier, 2000). A
patient with ISA may placidly accept only partial knowledge about his/her current state
and fail to engage in verification processes that one would normally carry out when faced
with novel or threatening challenges (Vuilleumier, 2004).
Conversely, there have also been hypotheses regarding the relationship between
ISA and brain dysfunction, and other comorbid cognitive sequelae (Vuilleumier, 2000).
Damage to subcortical circuits may lead to compromised self-monitoring processes and
inability to modify one’s beliefs and behaviours based on novel experience (Vuilleumier,
2000). General disorder theories of awareness deficits suggest there is an executive or
supervising control function providing direction to other subordinate cognitive skills and
therefore significant disruption of higher order cognition (e.g., monitoring, self
regulation) may lead to deficits in self-awareness (Stuss, 1991).
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Recent research has begun to examine the relationship between self-awareness
and other executive functions in neurological populations, including stroke. Although
there seems to be a relationship between executive functioning and self-awareness, no
specific neuropsychological profile is associated with ISA. Research has found that
specific deficits in set-shifting and flexibility, processes usually associated with the
frontal lobes, are more frequent in patients with ISA (Starkstein, Fedoroff, Price,
Leiguarda et al., 1993). In some studies, scores on executive function tasks have shown
stronger correlations with ISA than tests of other neuropsychological domains (Burgess,
Alderman, Evans, Emslie, & Wilson, 1998). In contrast, other studies have shown
measures of self-awareness to be unrelated to performance on other executive function
tasks (Bogod, Mateer, & Macdonald, 2003). The discrepant findings regarding the
relationship between executive functioning measures and self-awareness may stem from
the fact that they are both very complicated and multifaceted constructs. Although most
would agree that executive functioning comprises a vast array of distinct yet interacting
abilities, self-awareness has been viewed mostly as a one-dimensional entity. Also, selfawareness has proven to be a difficult phenomenon to operationally define and measure
given its complicated and intangible nature.
Measurement of ISA
The discrepancy between findings may result from how self-awareness is defined
and measured. There has been a lack of uniform methodology in neuropsychological
research examining this phenomenon. Approaches have used different definitions and
measurements o f awareness and hence given rise to different, and on occasion, divergent,
awareness results (Markova & Berrios, 2006). Early research on this construct generally
relied on clinical observation and rarely operationally defined unawareness of deficit with
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explicit criteria (Ergh, 2004). In general, there are three primary approaches to the
measurement of self-awareness: the discrepancy between the patient’s report and others’
(e.g., significant other, therapist, doctor); the discrepancy between the patient’s
description of his/her abilities and the actual abilities as measured by neuropsychological
tests; and a metacognitive approach employing predicted performance experiments. Most
often, self-awareness is measured by comparing the patient’s self-report on a
questionnaire to that of their significant other or relatives. The primary advantage to this
approach is that relatives often know the patient prior to the disability and spend a
significant amount of time with the patient in a variety of settings, thus acting as a reliable
informant (Ergh, 2004). However, although it is expected that the patient’s self-report
may be inaccurate, the reliance on significant others’ reports as the “correct”
determination o f the patient’s actual functioning may also lead to biased results since they
may lack objectivity and are usually emotionally invested in their significant other’s
functioning.
In order to eliminate the potential bias resulting from others’ reports, another
approach that has been implemented is the use of the discrepancy between the patient’s
description of his/her abilities and the patient’s abilities as measured by
neuropsychological tests. The primary advantage to this approach is that it includes an
objective measure of the patient’s deficits by using standardized tests of neurocognitive
performance that have normative bases. One of the most common measures used in this
approach is the Awareness Interview (Anderson & Tranel, 1989), a structured interview
of patients’ general descriptions of their abilities (e.g., memory, attention). Using this
methodology, Anderson and Tranel discovered that neurological damage resulting from
stroke, TBI, and dementia was frequently accompanied by some degree of unawareness
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of deficits. However, this approach relies on patients’ descriptions of broad domains (e.g,
memory) whereas the neuropsychological tests tend to be highly specific and novel. As
such, it becomes hard to determine whether the patient is reporting on the same ability
that is being measured by the neuropsychological test (Trosset & Kaszniak, 1996).
A more reliable and valid evaluation of self-awareness would involve the
comparison of the patient’s self-rating of a particular domain to their actual test
performance within that domain. This approach borrows from the metacognition literature
(i.e., knowing about one’s own cognitions) and implements predicted performance
experiments (Ergh, 2004; McGlynn & Kaszniak, 1991; Trosset & Kaszniak, 1996).
Patients predict their performance on specific cognitive tasks and awareness is measured
as the discrepancy between predicted and actual performance, thus allowing for a direct
comparison because the quantities are measured on the same scale (Trosset & Kaszniak,
1996). Trosset and Kaszniak (1996) introduced the basic analysis for using predicted
performance experiments. Their first experiment involved examining the discrepancy
between a patient’s predicted performance (ppp) and a patient’s actual performance (pap)
on a particular task using raw scores for the estimations. In following experiments, they
also asked patients to predict their caregiver’s cognitive performance (ppc) in order to
delineate whether an overall impairment in judgement was underlying the problem.
Finally, as a means of controlling whether overprediction of personal abilities was
disease-specific or just a general human tendency, Trosset and Kaszniak asked the
healthy caregivers to predict his/her own performance (cpc) as well as the patient’s
performance (cpp) while also measuring the caregiver’s actual performance (cap). From
these experiments, the researchers developed a final equation entitled the “Comparative
Prediction Accuracy” (CPA) which was calculated as:
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CPA = ( ppp/nan V(ppc/can)
(cpc/cap)/(cpp/pap)
Although this approach served as a foundation for future research, there were
several methodological limitations inherent in its design. First, this approach is limited by
its reliance on a person’s ability to predict their performance on a task with which they
are unfamiliar (Trosset & Kaszniak, 1996). Patients are typically asked to predict their
performance following task instructions; however they may still find it hard to ascertain
the cognitive functions tapped by the tasks. Failure to assess the cognitive abilities
underlying the tasks may hinder accurate predictions. This may be partially remedied by
obtaining post-task estimations from the patient, who at that time will have a better idea
o f what the task involved and how he/she performed. This approach also allows for an
evaluation of how well a patient is able to respond to feedback.
Using this approach, Marcel, Tegner, and Nimmo-Smith (2004) conducted one of
the strongest evaluations of the relationship between self-awareness and executive
functioning. They examined stroke patients’ ability to evaluate flexibly their performance
on traditional tests of executive functioning (e.g., sorting tasks, verbal fluency) based on
their pre-test expectations and actual test outcomes. Patients’ predictions of task
performance were compared to the patients’ actual performance. Overall, stroke patients
displayed a significant overestimation of their performance and the proportion of
overestimation increased as severity of executive dysfunction increased. Following that,
the researchers asked patients to re-evaluate their performance after the task. A

hemispheric difference was observed as those individuals with left-sided injuries made a
significant adjustment in their estimates whereas those with right-sided injuries showed
minimal adjustment. These results were consistent with the general consensus that
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awareness deficits occur predominantly in right-hemisphere injuries (Ownsworth,
McFarland, & Young, 2002). From these findings, the authors concluded that accurate
awareness of deficit requires some form of calibration based on direct personal
experience with the deficit and a special type of mental flexibility needed to adjust
behaviour based on that experience. As such, they suggested that when possible, post-task
estimations should also be used to obtain a more reliable index of self-awareness.
Second, this methodology involved the use of raw scores for estimation. Raw
scores are meaningless by themselves and need to be placed in the context of normative
expectations, particularly for patients who are unfamiliar with the task at hand (Ergh,
2004). Raw scores provide no anchor for which a person to accurately judge their
performance in comparison to the normative sample, or against the “average person”, nor
do they include the relative impairment ranges that correspond to test performance. For
example, if a patient is asked to predict how many items they will remember on a 20-item
recognition memory test, they may estimate 15 assuming that it equates to an aboveaverage performance (75% accuracy). In reality, this raw score would be indicative of
impaired performance when using normative comparison data. Thus, asking patients for
raw score equivalents most likely introduces more ambiguity to the measurement of
unawareness of deficit.
Ergh (2004) developed an alternative measurement technique to eliminate the
reliance on raw scores and their inherent ambiguity and pilot a model of metacognitive
awareness o f cognitive deficit for use in various populations. In the preliminary study,
individuals with multiple sclerosis (MS) were asked to rate their performance compared
to others their age. Instead of asking for raw scores, participants were provided choices
that could be scaled to T-score equivalents with clear interpretive markings (e.g.,
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extremely worse than other healthy people your age, much worse, worse, the same, better,
much better, and extremely better)(Ergh, 2004). They were then asked to estimate their
performance on the test based on the given performance ranges (patient’s predicted Tscore performance: pptp). The participant’s neuropsychological performance was also
converted to a T score based on normative data (patient’s actual T-score performance:
patp). By using this method, the difference score obtained was anchored in standard units.
The researcher then divided the discrepancy score by a measure of dispersion (normative
T-score standard deviation of 10) to anchor the result in standard deviation units, similar
to a z score. Thus, the result o f 1.0 was translated to the person overestimating his/her
performance by 1 standard deviation (i.e., 10 T-score points). Thus, Ergh proposed and
implemented “Metacognitive Discrepancy Scores” as the measure of awareness:
p a t p - pptp
10
Ergh utilized this equation for both pre- and post-test predictions. Positive scores
represented unawareness of cognitive deficits, whereas negative scores represented
hyperawareness (i.e., participants estimated that they performed worse than they actually
did). Using this method, the findings showed that approximately one third of the MS
sample demonstrated diminished awareness of their cognitive and/or functional deficits.
ISA Across Domains
Common sense suggests that ISA occurs across a wide variety of domains,
including emotional, physical, cognitive, and behavioural ones. Despite this, only a small

number of studies have directly compared the nature of self-awareness in different
contexts or domains and the results of these studies have been contradictory. Prigatano,
Altman, and O’Brien (1990) found that individuals who had suffered a traumatic brain
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injury showed differing levels of self-awareness across various domains. In comparison to
the reports of others regarding various activities of daily living, patients overestimated
their abilities in non-physical areas (i.e., social interaction, emotional control, cognition)
whereas their evaluations of their physical capabilities and self-care were more accurate.
Conversely, in a study examining 87 stroke patients, the largest discrepancy between
patients’ reports and those of their significant others occurred in the evaluation of motor
activities. On cognitive and emotional aspects, patients actually rated themselves as more
impaired than significant others did (Gauggel, Peleska, & Bode, 2000).
Anderson and Tranel (1989) examined ISA of cognitive and motor deficits among
stroke patients. A self-report measure of awareness was administered to patients 3 to 25
days post stroke. Whereas 28% of the patients were unaware of their motor deficits, 72%
o f the sample showed impaired awareness for cognitive deficits. Specifically, less than
one-third of patients were accurate about their abstracting abilities and 50% showed
impaired awareness of their memory and language functioning.
Fischer, Trexler, and Gauggel (2004) combined a self-report method with the
predicted performance method of self-awareness to examine possible domain differences.
Patients in two groups, a mixed neurological sample [traumatic brain injury (TBI) and
cerebrovascular accident (CVA)] and orthopaedic controls, were asked to complete test of
simple motor ability (finger tapping) and cognition (list learning). There was no over
prediction o f performance on simple motor tasks in any of the groups. There was a
discrepancy, however, between the TBI and CVA patients in both awareness measures.
Whereas the TBI group showed over-estimation in the self-report and list learning task,
the CVA group only showed an over-estimation in the list learning task, and to a lesser
extent than the TBI group. The authors used these results as the basis for warning against
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the assumption that some self-report measures that were designed initially for bilateral or
diffuse injuries (i.e., TBI) would reflect self-awareness deficits observed in asymmetric or
unilateral injuries, such as unilateral CVA. Instead, the authors suggested the use of the
predicted performance method in CVA populations.
From these findings, it appears that self-awareness in stroke patients differs as a
function o f the context involved. Self-awareness for novel versus familiar tasks has not
been examined. As Marcel’s theory stated, self-awareness requires some form of
calibration based on personal experience (Marcel et al., 2004) and an individual’s ability
to adjust behaviour based on this experience. As such, it is possible that self-awareness
following stroke may differ depending on the amount of experience one has had with the
task prior to injury; that is the degree of familiarity or habituation. Thus, individuals may
show less accurate self-appraisals of activities they believe are well-learned or familiar,
such as driving.
Driving After Stroke
Models o f Driving Ability
Many models of driving have been proposed in attempts to describe, classify, and
simplify its multidimensional nature. These models have contributed to the understanding
of driving by elucidating the components of normal driving as well as aiding the
determination of risk factors for unsafe driving. Models differ in their focus. Some
primarily describe emotional and motivational factors, others look only at cognitive
abilities, and, more recently, some have begun to describe the interaction of these
variables. Within neuropsychological research, however, most emphasis has been placed
on the cognitive and interactive models.
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Early in the driving literature, research focused on what were considered the basic
elements of driving performance. Specifically, there was an erroneous belief that
psychomotor abilities such as visual scanning, reaction time, along with knowledge of
driving regulations, interact to form a hypothetical construct of “driving skill”. The more
driving skill an individual had, the better driver they would be. Hopewell (2002) proposed
that this was related to what he termed the “rehabilitation myth” (p. 52) that is, the better
professionals trained a neurologically impaired driver, the more “driving skill” they
would recover, a concept analogous to exercising muscles to regain physical strength and
endurance. Hopewell stated that although such skills are necessary for successful driving,
they were by no means sufficient for safe driving. Instead, he theorized that these skills
were actually less predictive of driving risk than cognitive, executive, and personality
functions.
Michon (1985) proposed a theory of driving behaviour that included both basic
and higher order processes. He proposed three levels of decision-making involved in safe
driving rather than focusing on basic elements of driving performance. The strategic level
involved decisions concerning the planning of safe driving with regard to time and route.
This level was not time-dependent and could take place both in and out of the car.
Cognitively, functioning at this level was mostly memory and reasoning driven and
would therefore become impaired by deficits in memory, executive functioning, or
reasoning (Mazer et al., 2004). Michon’s second level involved decisions regarding the
basic manoeuvring and negotiation of common driving situations, decisions, and actions
and was termed the tactical level. At this stage, individuals were required to make correct
judgements of traffic situations and partake in anticipatory risk avoidance behaviours.
Decisions were somewhat time-dependent and data driven by one’s immediate driving
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environment. As such, performance at this level required cognitive control and flexibility,
awareness of traffic demands and allocating attention appropriately. Finally, the
operational level involved actual vehicle control inputs and comprised largely
automatized action patterns, immediate time reactions, and perceptual speed. Michon
described this level as the most basic of the three and involving what was previously
termed “driving skill.”
Since the inception of Michon’s model, much research has examined performance
among these levels in both neurologically intact and impaired populations. Despite
Michon’s proposal stating that each of the three levels was equally important, most
neuropsychological researchers and clinical practitioners have continued to focus
primarily on the operational level (i.e., “driving skill” elements), and to a lesser extent,
the tactical level, whereas higher order executive functioning and reasoning involved in
actual driving behaviour have been left relatively unexamined. The unequal focus on
operational tasks may result from the nature of the neuropsychological tests themselves.
Basic cognitive skills (e.g., reaction time) are easier to separate and evaluate than more
complex and multifaceted constructs such as executive functioning and reasoning.
However, given the equal importance that Michon placed on higher order and strategic
decision making, compared with the other two levels, examination of these variables
would surely provide important information about the elucidation and prediction of
driving behaviours.
Whereas Michon’s model of driving focused on the components of safe driving,
Galski and colleagues (Galski, Bruno, & Ehle, 1992) proposed a Cybernetic model
designed to diagnose the cause of driving problems. The authors delineated between what
they termed “general” and “specific” driving programs. The general driving program
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consisted of the executive skills needed for driving, including complex information
processing that serves as a mechanism that initiates and directs all driving-related
activities. It also included dynamic memory, which was described as an expert system
required to apply road knowledge in routine situations yet also maintain the capacity to
adopt to new situations with the use of available information. With brain damage,
individuals were hypothesized to lose some or all of their dynamic memory which could
be seen in their incapacity to build upon driving experience or to apply learned
information. The specific driving program was considered a volitional process that sets
and implements particular driving plans once the general program determines the most
effective approach.
The Cybernetic model also includes four additional systems according to Galski
and colleagues (1992). The first two of these systems consist of the basic sensory input
and motor output encountered in the driving environment. The third system serves to
calculate, integrate, and coordinate sensory information by mechanisms such as efficient
visual scanning and selective attention. It is referred to as the calculation and construction
co-processor. Finally, Galski and colleagues describe the “resident diagnostic program”
the most complex of the four additional systems. This system’s primary purpose is to act
as a warning mechanism to the driver about potential dangers to the rest of the system. To
do so, this system requires intact cognitive reasoning, executive functioning, and
psychological factors.
As both Michon and the Cybernetic model suggest, driving is a complex and
multifaceted task that is hindered by deficits at various levels, from basic reaction time
and sensory input to complex executive functioning and reasoning. The strong theoretical
foundation put forth by these researchers is, therefore, particularly important in research
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examining driving in neurologically impaired populations. However, despite their
emphasis on higher-order and executive functioning, research has only recently begun to
fully investigate the various processes involved in driving in these populations.
Examination of these variables is particularly important in populations known to
demonstrate various deficits in executive functioning, such as individuals with stroke.
Driving Ability Following Stroke
Many factors contribute to an individual’s decision to resume driving duties
following stroke, including the opinion of the clinician, need or desire to drive again, as
well as the cognitive and physical limitations following stroke and the degree to which
the individual perceives these restrictions to performance. Clearly, some sequelae of
stroke, such as visual field deficits (e.g., homonymous hemianopia), epileptic seizures,
neglect, and apraxia, strongly contradict driving resumption. The relationship between
cognitive impairment and driving safety tends to follow an “inverted-U” distribution of
risk versus injury severity. Those with very severe strokes will be less likely to return to
driving as their level of physical and cognitive functioning clearly prevents independent
functioning during even basic activities of daily living. Thus, they pose little driving risk.
On the other end o f the spectrum, individuals with very mild strokes will most likely
exhibit very few, if any, residual deficits and will therefore show no more safety risk than
the average driver. The individuals whose stroke severity falls between the very mild and
very profound, however, are those who necessitate fitness to drive assessments and
driving rehabilitation as they pose the greatest risks to themselves and others if they
attempt to return to driving prematurely.
There is much debate as to whether stroke survivors pose an exaggerated safety
risk on the road. Some studies suggest that stroke survivors show no increased risk for
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accidents or citations compared to normal controls (Haselkom, Mueller, & Rivara, 1998;
Katz et al., 1990) whereas others have found a history of stroke or transient ischemic
attacks (TIA) to be significantly associated with accidents five years post-injury (Sims,
McGwin, Allman, Ball, & Owsley, 2000). Similarly, others have argued that a strong
relationship exists between stroke and driving risk but this relationship is masked by the
fact that stroke is strongly correlated with decreased average mileage (Lyman, McGwin
Jr., & Sims, 2001). In a review of the literature, van Zomeren and colleagues concluded
“brain-damaged drivers could not, in general, be seen as risky drivers, although some
individuals show decreased driving skill and risky behavior in traffic” (van Zomeren,
Brouwer, & Minderhoud, 1987, p. 697). These studies differed in their evaluation of
“safe” driving behaviour (e.g., number of traffic citations, self-report). These variations
may contribute to the debate over stroke patients’ driving safety. Therefore, a valid and
comprehensive method of identifying stroke patients who are unsafe to resume driving is
beneficial, if not necessary.
Neuropsychological assessment has been demonstrated to be helpful in the
identification of unsafe driving performance because it examines the many facets of both
stroke and driving ability, including cognitive, emotional, and behavioural functioning.
Hopewell and van Zomeren (1990) proposed that five major factors account for most of
the variance in driving skill and driving risk: driving and accident/violation history,
general personality and attitudinal factors, pattern and severity of alcohol/substance
abuse, nature and extent o f psychiatric and executive disturbance, and basic psychomotor
abilities. Therefore, neuropsychological assessment is helpful in this setting as it allows
for the evaluation o f psychiatric, executive, and psychomotor abilities, all of which are
known to be potentially affected by stroke.
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Although basic sensory-perceptual functions are frequently compromised after
stroke, the presence of such impairment does not necessarily hinder driving ability. For
example, peripheral vision and contrast sensitivity were found to be impaired in
comparison to healthy controls in stroke survivors but impairments in peripheral vision or
visual acuity did not distinguish between stroke survivors who did and did not resume
driving (Fisk, Owsley, & Mennemeier, 2002). Similarly, Nouri and colleagues found that
the results of tests of vision and visual fields were not related to driving performance
(Nouri, Tinson, & Lincoln, 1987).
More complex visual abilities, however, such as visual scanning, as well as
selective and divided attention, have been found to be related to driving performance in
stroke patients. Specifically, the Useful Field of View (UFOV) test (Ball & Owsley,
1992) has been found to be one of the neuropsychological tests most predictive of driving
performance. The test augments the assessment of simple peripheral vision by increasing
the functional visual capacity under conditions of increasing cognitive load, thus
requiring intact divided attention, visual search, and scanning. Myers and others (Myers,
Bal, Kalina, Roth, & Goode, 2000) found that the UFOV test alone showed 86% accuracy
in predicting outcome of on-road driving evaluations. This finding is consistent with other
studies that revealed the UFOV to be strongly related to driving ability in both normal
aging populations and stroke (Fisk et al., 2002; Whelihan, DiCarlo, & Paul, 2005). In
fact, it has been proposed that the UFOV, or other measures of brief, vision-based
complex attention measures always be used in fitness to drive assessments (Bieliauskas,
2005). The UFOV has also been used as a rehabilitation mechanism for driving retraining
and found to result in a two-fold increase in rate of success on on-road driving
evaluations (Mazer et al., 2003).
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Other basic neuropsychological abilities, such as reaction time and processing
speed, are consistently impaired in stroke patients when compared to matched controls
(e.g., Lundqvist, Gerdle, & Ronnberg, 2000; Sundet, Goffeng, & Hofft, 1995) but their
ability to predict driving performance remains unclear. Whereas simple reaction time has
been cited as a significant predictor of driving performance in some studies (e.g.,
Lundqvist, Gerdle, & Ronnberg, 2000; Schanke & Sundet, 2000), others have failed to
find a significant relationship between the two (Nouri et al., 1987). Most likely these
inconsistencies arise from the nature of the reaction time measures themselves, as some
utilize simple reaction time and others use complex choice reaction time tasks.
Among pre-driving neuropsychological assessments, slowed information
processing speed is mentioned consistently as one of the strongest predictors of poor on
road performance (Engum, Cron, Hulse, Pendergrass, & Lambert, 1988; Gouvier et al.,
1989; Schanke & Sundet, 2000; Sundet et al., 1995). Although the types of measures used
to assess processing speed differ, one of the most effective is the Symbol Digit Modalities
Test (SDMT; Smith, 1991). Gouvier and colleagues (1989) showed that the oral version
of the SDMT accounted for 70% of the variance in an on-road driving score. Since then,
the SDMT remains one of the most consistently impaired neuropsychological tests in
individuals who are considered not fit to drive (Schanke & Sundet, 2000).
From these results, there appears to be a general trend: as the cognitive demand of
a task increases, so does that task’s relationship with driving performance. Accordingly, it
is not surprising that higher order executive functions are, almost without exception, the
strongest predictors of on-road driving performance. Many studies have listed specific
executive functions as significant predictors of future driving success, including response
disinhibition and impulsivity (Engum et al., 1988; Hopewell, 2002; Schanke & Sundet,
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2000), impaired problem solving and complex reasoning (Nouri et al., 1987; Nouri &
Lincoln, 1992), planning and organization (Galski, Bruno, & Ehle, 1992), and overall
poor judgment (Engum et al., 1988). Cognitive flexibility, often measured by the Trail
Making Test-B, is one of the executive functions most often cited as a strong predictor of
driving ability (Hopewell, 2002; Schanke & Sundet, 2000). In one study, stroke patients
who performed poorly on both the TMT-B and a visual-perception test were 22 times
more likely to fail an on-road driving evaluation (Mazer, Komer-Bitensky, & Sofer,
1998). Similarly, using a discriminant function analysis, Sundet and others (1995) found
that the TMT-B (specifically a cutoff score greater than 180 seconds) was the single most
potent variable in the classification of driving status post-stroke.
The results of these neuropsychological studies lead to two conclusions. First,
those who have criticized current driving training programs for focusing too much on
driving skills at the operational level (i.e., handling the car) are supported by
neuropsychological research that has suggested that emphasis should instead be placed on
higher order cognitive skills at the tactical or strategic level. Second, although the pre
driving neuropsychological battery is useful in predicting on-road performance (e.g.,
TMT-B, SDMT, UFOV) there is still much variance left unaccounted for in stroke
patients. This suggests that some aspects of driving behaviour remain unexamined or that
there exist mediating variables affecting the relationship between neuropsychological
functioning and driving performance. Self-awareness may be one such variable.
Self-Evaluation of Driving Ability in Stroke
Success of driving interventions and return to the road following stroke depend on
the ability of drivers at risk to recognize problems so they are willing to undergo
interventions. Self-awareness acts as a critical moderating variable in the relationship
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between stroke and driving safety. Individuals with intact self-awareness, regardless of
extent of neurocognitive and physical limitations, are less likely to act unsafely.
Individuals with intact self-awareness may compensate for residual impairments by
strategically limiting their exposure to risky situations (e.g., driving at night, heavy
traffic) or may cease driving completely as a successful mechanism for managing risk
(Coleman, Rapport, & Hanks, 2004). Overall, some studies suggest that stroke survivors
are capable o f making accurate judgements about their driving ability (Golper, Rau, &
Marshall, 1980) although others report the opposite (Hartje, Willmes, Pach, Hannen, &
Weber, 1991). Recently, Rapport and colleagues found individuals’ perceptions of
barriers to driving provided unique information in the prediction of objective and
subjective indices of community integration even after accounting for other potentially
important variables like injury severity (Rapport, Hanks, & Bryer, 2006). Futhermore,
Scott and colleagues (Scott et al., 2007) reported that stroke survivors’ endorsement of
only convenience/ease (while disregarding professional advice and physical functioning)
as an important consideration in the decision to resume driving may reflect unawareness
of their deficits and the high importance they place on the ability to drive and the
independence it affords them.
Self-awareness for driving ability may be compromised in stroke populations
because o f several factors. First, studies of normal drivers’ attitudes towards their safety
and skill have revealed a seemingly universal phenomenon of self-enhancement bias in
that between 60% to 90% of people claim to be better than the average driver
(Delhomme, 1991). It has been shown consistently that regardless of age, gender, or
actual driving record, drivers rate their own driving ability as being better than that of
their peers and they estimate their risk for accidents as lower than the average driver
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(Finn & Bragg, 1986; Groeger & Brown, 1989; Matthews & Moran, 1986; Svenson,
1981). Second, based on the aforementioned literature, stroke survivors demonstrate
impaired levels of self-awareness in a variety of domains over and above the self
enhancement bias seen in normals. Third, stroke patients often over-estimate their
abilities in novel cognitive tasks; thus, it could be hypothesized that this tendency toward
over-estimation will be exacerbated in a context (i.e., driving) within which individuals
feel more confident in their ability and have been found to be susceptible to general self
enhancing biases.
Finally, previous researchers have suggested that ISA is most likely to occur when
the motivation to self-deceive is high and there is a lack of concrete evidence or
information available by which to self-evaluate (Flashman & McAllister, 2002). Both of
these scenarios are pertinent in fitness to drive assessments and self-evaluation of driving
ability. For clients with neurologic impairment who already have had to face great
changes in their lifestyle, driving is an integral component o f successful community
reintegration. Clearly, this increases one’s motivation to believe that driving ability is left
intact following an injury. Second, during the initial recovery process and in rehabilitation
settings, most patients are rarely faced with driving situations as their cognitive deficits
preclude any attempts at returning to driving duties. As such, the individual is not
provided with concrete information from which to make accurate self-evaluations about
driving ability. This strengthens the argument for the use of driving simulators as a
potential assessment and rehabilitation tool as it provides the patient with concrete and
face valid evidence regarding their driving capabilities.
A small number of studies have included self-awareness measures among pre
driving evaluations and the preliminary results strongly support the notion that self-
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awareness is highly related to driving ability. Heikkila et al. (1999) examined stroke
patients’ performance on a lab-style driving task. Although patients performed poorly on
all lab measures (e.g., reaction time to signals, directional errors), they continually
overestimated their abilities, particularly on attention measures. From these results, they
concluded “when driving capability is being judged, one of the excluding criteria should
be the obvious absence of self-criticism including merely denying the symptoms of one’s
disease” (p.3 54).
Similar to these findings, Schanke and Sundet (2000) examined the predictability
of neuropsychological testing in determining rates of on-road failures in a mixed
neurological population composed primarily of stroke patients. Self-awareness, as
measured by the Awareness Index, was one of the most consistently impaired measures in
the groups considered not suited for driving. In fact, only measures of reaction time and
anosognosia significantly differentiated between the participants who passed and failed
the on-road examination.
Freund and colleagues (Freund, Colgrove, Burke, & McLeod, 2005) explored
whether elderly drivers of varying driving skill levels differed in their perception of their
driving evaluation performance and if self-rated driving evaluation performance was
related to cognitive ability. Consistent with the universal bias, 65% of drivers rated
themselves as performing better on a driving test than others their age. Furthermore, as
self-rated driving evaluation performance increased, there was a significantly increased
risk of unsafe driving. In fact, drivers who considered themselves at least a little better
than other drivers their age were over four times more likely to be unsafe drivers
compared to others who believed they were comparable to or worse than other drivers
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their age. This pattern persisted despite the absence of a significant relationship between
cognitive ability and how drivers rated themselves.
In sum, ISA is a common and potentially devastating consequence of stroke. Most
theories suggest that self-awareness comprises numerous factors and processes and is
highly related to other executive functions but the empirical findings remain equivocal.
Previous research has implemented various techniques in hopes of reliably assessing the
construct, with most studies using self-report and other-report discrepancy data. Due to
the inherent limitations of these methods, recent research has shifted to the use of
predictive performance methods. These results have shown that self-awareness in stroke
differs depending on the domain or context assessed. One context that has not received
much research attention is self-evaluation of driving ability in stroke patients. Research in
this field may be particularly relevant as both theory and empirical data show that selfawareness deficits may be especially frequent in contexts involving highly automatized
and emotionally-invested tasks. One promising mechanism that would allow for a more
ecologically valid evaluation and possible retraining of driving skill in stroke patients is
the driving simulator.
The Use of Driving Simulators in Fitness to Drive Evaluations
Although on-road tests are considered by many to the gold standard of evaluating
driving ability but they are expensive, pose unnecessary safety risks, and only measure
overt driving behaviour while failing to identify subtle psychological and psychomotor
impairments that affect these fundamental skills (Klavora, Heslegrove, & Young, 2000).
Therefore, off-road driving assessments are a safer method for clearly identifying driving
capacities of stroke survivors. At the same time, off-road determinants of fitness to drive,
such as medical examinations, psychological assessment, and even pre-driver
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neuropsychological evaluations leave much variance unexplained. Therefore, driving
simulators are a beneficial alternative because ethical constraints do not always permit
impaired drivers to undergo on-road driving and the predictive validity of
neuropsychological pre-driver evaluations remains questionable (Galski, Ehle, & Bruno,
1990; Schanke & Sundet, 2000; van Zomeren et al., 1987).
Contrary to on-road evaluations, the use of driving simulators provides the
opportunity to analyze and practice driving situations under a variety of conditions
without the risk of accident whereas in on-road evaluations, it is impossible to
consistently assess potentially dangerous situations using vehicles. It allows for repetition,
review, and immediate feedback regarding performance. Driving simulators are superior
to pen-and-paper neuropsychological tests because they provide an individual with visual
information in a similar manner to that encountered in real world driving (Schultheis &
Mourant, 2001). In comparison to on-road evaluations, it is less costly but still allows for
the gathering of quantitative data on performance. This information can facilitate
assessment and allow for monitoring and comparison over time (Mazer et al., 2004).
Overall, driving simulators are useful in driving assessments as they maintain an
appropriate balance between public safety and personal autonomy of people with
impairments caused by cerebral injury (Haselkom et al., 1998). Bieliauskas (2005)
concluded “driving simulator-based studies are probably the best way to assess the
likelihood of safe driving when faced with a challenge (i.e., an unusual situation requiring
decision-making and behavioral response while driving)” (p. 224-5).
Over time, studies of the clinical utility of driving simulators have progressed
across several levels of validation (Lew et al., 2005). First, at the simplest level, driving
simulator performance has been examined in terms of sensitivity to different groups of
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drivers (e.g., neurologically impaired versus healthy controls) in order to determine its
discriminant validity. Second, research has also examined convergent validity by
investigating the level of agreement between driving simulators, pre-driving cognitive
screenings, and on-road tests. Finally, recent research has begun to examine the
ecological validity o f driving simulators by looking at performance in relation to driving
performance in the community.
Currently, there is a scarcity of research examining the validity of driving
simulators across these various domains, particularly in stroke populations. Most research
that has been completed has utilized mixed neurological populations or has only focused
on the relative predictive validity of driving simulators regarding on-road driving
performance. Driving simulators have been found to be valid measures of real automobile
driving in healthy participants in terms of speed and positioning (Tomros, 1998). In terms
of neurological populations, however, the results are less consistent.
Nouri and Tinson (1988) were the first researchers to examine the efficacy of
driving simulation in determining fitness to drive. In a preliminary study, they examined
the value o f a driving simulator in 38 stroke patients by comparing judgments of driving
fitness from simulator and road-test. Gradings based on the simulator alone were not good
predictors o f performance; although the simulator provided useful predictions for the
majority, a significant number of participants were still misclassified in terms of their
driving safety. Nouri and Tinson’s study had significant technological limitations, which
compromised the face validity of the driving simulator. In this experiment, the driving
simulator comprised green light acceleration and braking reaction time variables only.
Very few studies have systematically examined the relationship between driving
simulators and on-road driving since Nouri and Tinson’s (1998) article. The studies that
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have examined the utility of driving simulators have revealed mixed findings. Some
researchers have found small correlations between driving simulator and on-road
performance (e.g., Monga, 1997; Owsley, 1997) or between driving simulator
performance and subsequent traffic accidents or citations (Keller, Kesserling, &
Hiltbrunner, 2003) among various populations, thus supporting Nouri and Tinson’s
questioning regarding the predictive validity of driving simulators. There has been an
equal number of studies, however, that have found impressive results in populations such
as stroke and TBI (e.g,. Galski et al., 1992; Lundqvist et al., 2000).
Galski and colleagues (1992) administered a sophisticated and multifaceted
driving simulator task, a comprehensive neuropsychological battery, and an on-road
evaluation to a mixed neurological sample (22 TBI, 13 CVA). Whereas 64% of on-road
performance was explained by measures of visual perception, planning, organization, and
executive functioning, the driving simulator performance accounted for 63% of the on
road outcome alone. From this, the authors postulated that the driving simulator was
superior in predicting on-road performance because, similar to real world driving, it
tapped into integrated abilities rather than separate abilities usually examined by
neuropsychological measures.
Lundqvist, Gerdle, and Ronnberg (2000) asked individuals post stroke to complete
a neuropsychological evaluation, driving simulator, and on-road driving evaluation. The
comprehensive neuropsychological battery displayed an impressive 83% correct
classification regarding on-road driving performance (pass/fail dichotomy). The driving
simulator, however, independently was able to accurately classify 85% of individuals’
overall driving skill. Although the results were comparable, both the time and effort put
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forth to complete the comprehensive neuropsychological evaluation far exceeded the
driving simulator, thus supporting the utility of this procedure.
Some of the incongruence between these studies is attributable to the nature of the
driving simulators themselves. With improved technology, driving simulators have
become more sophisticated in terms of the number of variables included, visual output,
and overall task complexity, all of which make them more comparable to real world
driving. Most of the studies that failed to show a relationship between driving simulator
and real-world performance implemented basic, single measures of evaluation, such as
braking reaction time (Nouri & Tinson, 1988) or lane-tracking (Keller et al., 2003).
One of the few studies that have systematically examined the ecological validity
of driving simulators was conducted by Lew and colleagues (Lew et al., 2005). Their
study compared individuals with mixed severity TBI and controls at two phases: the
baseline phase included an on-road driving test and a driving simulator test; and a 9
months post-baseline examination incorporating participants’ driving records, number of
infractions, and observational data. Not surprisingly, the TBI group performed worse on
all the driving simulator variables than controls. In fact, within the TBI group,
performance was worse on the driving simulator than the actual road-test. Driving
simulator measures were significantly correlated with long-term driving outcome and
showed a strong ability to predict driving skill at the 9-month follow-up (i.e., 82%
prediction efficiency). The authors concluded that the driving simulator provided unique
information beyond the road test because it is able to present individuals with a wider and
less predictable range of driving situations than on-road tests, which may be the reason
why individuals performed worse on the driving simulator. Although these results suggest
promising sensitivity, they warrant some caveats regarding driving simulator specificity
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when the difficulty of the driving simulator test is greater than actual on-road
performance.
The Driving Simulator as a Retraining Tool
A new topic of interest in research has become the utility of the driving simulator
as a retraining tool. The driving simulator provides a safe yet realistic and comprehensive
method for retraining neuropsychologically impaired individuals who wish to resume
driving. Perhaps the greatest contribution of the simulator to driving rehabilitation,
however, is the potential to elicit awareness. Self-awareness is considered one of the most
critical aspects of successful rehabilitation (Hartmann-Maeir et al., 2003) and as such any
instruments that serve to gamer improved awareness of deficit would be of great benefit
to rehabilitation outcome. Driving simulators, in theory, have potential to be efficacious
rehabilitation tools as they provide patients with immediate feedback, facilitate discovery
during task performance, and provide concrete evidence of capabilities. Unlike pen-andpaper neuropsychological tests, driving simulators mimic real world driving situations
and are therefore more likely to elicit increased self-awareness of driving-related skills. In
other words, it will be easier for a patient to come to realize they have neuropsychological
deficits that preclude driving if they perform poorly on a test actually involving driving
rather than on a neuropsychological test that is completely novel and non-contextual.
Very few studies have examined the driving simulator as a rehabilitation
mechanism and no studies have examined the driving simulator’s relationship to selfawareness. Cimolino and Balkovec (1988) reported on the use of a driving simulator in
the evaluation of training disabled adolescent new drivers and adults with stroke.
Unfortunately, the authors did not provide details of the training, but reported a large
increase in driving simulator scores over time for the adolescents. No differences were
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noted for the stroke population. The improved driving simulator performance in this study
is not surprising given that the outcome measure was also the training measure. Simple
practice effects would lead to improved performance, although this was not true for the
stroke survivors. Since this study, there has been no attempt to examine whether driving
simulators are capable of improving self-awareness deficits known to impede driving
resumption.
Summary and Present Study
In summary, previous research has revealed driving to be a complex and
multifaceted process consisting of various levels of cognitive, emotional, and
motivational factors. Despite theories that suggest their importance and superiority in
predicting on-road performance, executive functions have only recently begun to be
investigated. Even when tests of executive functions are included in fitness to drive
assessments, the test batteries rarely, if ever, examine the full spectrum of executive
functions, thus leaving some specific processes unexamined. Perhaps the most important
of these is self-awareness and the ability to use feedback as a mediator for future
behaviour.
In stroke populations, ISA is evident in various severities and manifestations,
ranging from severe instances of hemi-neglect to more subtle over-estimations of
cognitive abilities and degree of recovery. Whereas severe forms of self-awareness
deficits like neglect are easy to detect and assuredly preclude a return to driving, more
subtle over-estimations in cognitive abilities may be as crucial an impediment to safe
driving, yet rarely are assessed in neuropsychological examinations of fitness to drive.
Previous research examining self-awareness has been limited by several
methodological shortcomings. One of the most problematic has been the inconsistency in
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the operational definition and measurement of the construct. Previous reliance exclusively
on self-report data or discrepancy analyses using raw scores led to a large amount of
ambiguity. Recent research has moved toward a metacognitive approach using predicted
performance experiments. This work has had promising results. Another limitation of
previous research has been exclusion of control groups. This limitation is particularly
troubling given the robust findings pertaining to a general human tendency to over
estimate one’s personal abilities. It is possible that the tendency for individuals to over
estimate their performance is not exclusive to neurologically impaired populations.
Regardless o f the population being examined, self-awareness is not a unidimensional
construct but can instead be considered as context-specific and fluctuating. Specifically, it
is possible that self-awareness differs depending on the novelty of the task. In other
words, individuals may hold different perceptions of their abilities depending on whether
the task is novel and unfamiliar (such as neuropsychological tasks) or one well known to
them and considered automatic (i.e., driving). Also, stroke survivors’ ability to adapt their
perception of their ability may differ depending on the type of feedback given to them.
Therefore, implementation of mechanisms such as driving simulators may be more
successful in altering individuals’ perceptions of their true abilities because, unlike pen
and paper neuropsychological tests, they demonstrate greater face validity to actual
driving performance.
Therefore, the purpose of the present study was two-fold. First, this study
compared stroke survivors’ self-evaluation or awareness of driving performance to that of
healthy matched controls to determine whether they provided accurate self-evaluations of
driving ability. Second, it compared both control subjects and stroke survivors’ selfawareness on novel and abstract neuropsychological tests and well-leamed/skilled and
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functional driving simulator tasks to determine whether self-awareness changed as a
function of the context, and if this pattern differed in healthy versus neurologically
impaired populations.
It was hypothesized that stroke patients would demonstrate greater ISA than
healthy controls across most measures. Specifically, the stroke patients would show larger
over-estimations in their rated versus their actual performance on the neuropsychological
and driving simulator measures. Furthermore, it was hypothesized that the stroke patients,
as a group, would show less change in their pre- and post-test self-evaluations than the
control group. Finally, within the stroke group, there would be a significant difference in
self-evaluation depending on whether the task was perceived to be novel (i.e.,
neuropsychological) or relatively familiar (i.e., driving simulator). Specifically, it was
hypothesized that the discrepancy between estimated and actual performance would be
greater on the driving simulator task. Furthermore, the discrepancy between the selfevaluation of performance on novel versus familiar tasks would be significantly larger in
the stroke group than the control participants.
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Chapter 2: Method
Participants
Sixty-six participants (33 stroke survivors, 33 controls) were recruited from
various sources including the inpatient Stroke and Neuroscience service at the
Rehabilitation Institute of Michigan (RIM), the outpatient follow-up care at RIM, and the
RIM Driving Education and Training Center (DETC).
Table 1
Demographic means and standard deviations of stroke and control groups.
Demographic Variable

Stroke Group (n=30)

Control Group (n=30)

Age Mean (SD)
Range

54.3 (9.1)
32-70

48.5 (13.0)
20-72

Gender (Male/Female)

15/15

12/18

Education Mean (SD)
Range

13.9 (2.2)
9-20

13.7(2.5)
10-20

Race (Caucasian/African American)

11/19

11/19

Location of Stroke
Left
Right
Bilateral
Systemic

17
9
3
1

Chronicity in Months Mean (SD)
Range

46.0 (65.0)
3-280

Driving Since Stroke? Yes/No

19/11

Stroke survivors were at least 3 months post stroke. In those cases where it was
possible, the control participants were the patient’s significant other/caregiver to
minimize demographic confounds. In other cases, the control participant was a close
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family member or friend. Inclusionary criteria for all participants included: having driven
within 3 months prior to the stroke, or for healthy controls to have driven 3 months prior
to testing; English as a first language; be between 20 and 70 years of age; and to be
without a self-reported severe psychiatric diagnosis or history or other neurological
disorders. Participants received financial compensation for their participation ($50 per
participant pair). Following data screening (see results section), 60 individuals were
retained for data analyses. The demographic characteristics of both the stroke and control
groups can be seen in Table 1.
Materials
Doron AMOS (Advanced Mobile Operation SystenO-2 Driving Simulator. This state-ofthe-art simulator is completely interactive and provides 240 degrees of visual field
contained in a life-sized model of a typical automobile cockpit, with sensory feedback
including sound, vibration, and moving air. Unlike very high-end simulators used for
military and automotive training, this type of simulator is designed as an advanced
clinical driving simulator specifically designed for the clinical evaluation of drivingrelated skills. The evaluation takes approximately 45 minutes and includes four sequences
that simulate “real life” encounters: (a) residential and light business traffic; (b) rural
traffic and roadways (including lane changes); (c) challenging situations that require
forethought and quick response time (e.g., near collisions, emergency vehicles); and (d) a
skills track module that includes assessment of brake reaction, front-end parking, and
distance estimation. The specific driving scenarios were developed with consultation
from RIM’s DETC evaluators and the technical consultants at Doron, who are nationally
recognized as leading experts in evaluation and training of driving skills using simulator
technology. The driving scenarios scores yield an overall total score, which was used for
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the purpose of the current study. This score is calculated by tallying the total number of
correct items across all of the scenarios within several domains, including speed, stop
distance, lane placement, traffic signal use, hazard avoidance, and obeying traffic signs
and signals.
Trail Making Test-B (TMT-B: Reitan & Wolfson. 19851: This test examines complex
attention, processing speed, sequencing and cognitive flexibility. It requires the
connection, by making pencil lines, between 25 encircled numbers and letters in
alternating order. Test-retest reliability ranges from .67 to .72 (Snow, Tierney, Zorzitto,
Fischer, & Reid, 1988) in various neuropsychological populations. The test has been
found to highly sensitive to various forms of brain damage (Spreen & Strauss, 1998). For
the purposes of this study, normative data was taken from Heaton and colleagues’ wellknown demographically-adjusted norms for the Halstead-Reitan neuropsychological
battery (Heaton, Miller, Taylor, & Grant, 2005). This test was included in the current
study as a result of previous research showing it to be very sensitive to neurocognitive
impairment and highly related to driving performance (Hopewell, 2002; Schanke &
Sundet, 2000).
Neuropsychological Assessment Battery-Judgment subtest (NAB Judgment. White &
Stem. 20011: This test assesses an individual’s judgment and verbal reasoning in the
context of everyday situations. It includes a series of questions about home safety, health,
and medical issues likely to be encountered in everyday life. The test includes 10
questions generated from six categories: 1) home safety; 2) personal hygiene; 3)
medication safety; 4) motor vehicle driving safety; 5) medical decision making; and 6)
general judgment. Test-retest reliability is modest (.43), and may result from large
variability o f scores (White & Stem, 2001). Interrater reliability has been reported as .85
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for both forms (White & Stem, 2001). Due to the relative newness of the test, the
subtest’s validity and sensitivity in stroke populations has yet to be determined. The
current study used the normative tables provided in the test’s administration manual. This
test was included in the present study because, unlike some of the other measures, it is not
time-dependent which allows for evaluation of executive functioning without processing
speed confound. Also, it provides a verbally rather than visually-based tool.
Symbol Digit Modalities Test (SDMT: Smith. 1991k This test is used to assess visual
scanning, tracking, motoric speed, and complex attention. It requires the patient to
examine a series of nine meaningless geometric designs and for each symbol in the
sequence, search a key for that symbol and substitute a number, either orally or in writing.
Test-retest reliability has been reported as .80 for the written version and .76 for the oral
version (Smith, 1991). In terms of validity, the SDMT has been found to be one of the
most sensitive measures of cerebral integrity in stroke and the single best predictor of
reduced speed of processing (Ponsford & Kinsella, 1992; Smith, 1991). Normative data
was taken from also taken from the Heaton norms (Heaton et al., 2005). Similar to the
TMT-B, the SDMT was chosen for this study due to its strong predictive abilities in terms
of driving performance (Gouvier et al., 1989).
Controlled Oral Word Association Test (COWAT: Benton. Hamsher. & Sivan. 19831:
This test was developed to evaluate the spontaneous production of words beginning with
a given letter of the alphabet, thus assessing verbal association fluency, as well as self
initiation and organization. For letter (phonetic association) fluency, the subject is asked
to produce orally as many words as possible beginning with a given letter in a limited
period of time. F, A, and S are the most commonly used letters for this test, although
alternate forms have also been implemented and standardized (e.g., C, F, and L; P, R, and
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W). Test-retest reliability ranges from .70 to .88 (Bardi, Hamby, & Wilkins, 1995; Snow
et al., 1988). In terms of validity, Mutchnick and colleagues found letter fluency to be
among the five best significant discriminators between brain damaged and
pseudoneurological controls (Mutchnick, Ross, & Long, 1991). The normative data for
this test was also taken from the Heaton norms (Heaton et al., 2005). Again, this measure
was selected because it allowed for the evaluation of verbally-based and speeded
executive functioning.
Mini Mental Status Examination (MMSE: Folstein. Folstein. & McHugh. 1975): The
purpose of this test is to screen for mental impairment, to document intellectual changes
occurring over time, and to assess the effects of potential factors in cognitive functioning.
The test consists of 11 items that assess orientation to time and place,
attention/concentration, language, constructional ability, and immediate and delayed
recall. Estimates of test-retest reliability generally fall between .80 and .95 (Tombaugh &
McIntyre, 1992). Most studies report that the MMSE is sensitive to the presence of
dementia, especially in those with moderate to severe forms of cognitive impairment
(Spreen & Strauss, 1998).
Metacognitive Awareness of Context-Specific Cognitive Ability (Ergh, 2004): This
measure borrows from the metacognitive literature and uses Metacognitive Discrepancy
Scores. Procedures and scoring criteria for the Metacognitive Discrepancy Scores were
described by Ergh (2004) as follows: Following the standardized administration of task
instructions, the participant is given a rating scale (see Appendix A) and asked to predict
his/her performance in comparison to same-aged healthy people (pre-test predicted
performance ratings). The task is then administered and following this, the participants
are again asked to rate their performance using the same scale (post-test predicted
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performance ratings). This procedure was performed for each of the neuropsychological
measures (excluding the MMSE that is only being used as a screening measure) for both
the stroke and control groups. There were three primary discrepancy scores reflecting
differences between: a) the predicted and postdicted ratings, b) the predicted ratings and
actual performance; and, c) the postdicted ratings and actual performance. In order to
compare the ratings and actual performance, participants’ ratings had to first be converted
to T scores. Appendix B provides the specific guidelines used to convert patient ratings to
T-score equivalents. A similar procedure was used for each of the three discrepancy
scores. Using the pre-test predictions, the patient predicted T-score performance (PPTP)
for a specific neuropsychological task was subtracted from the patient’s actual T-score
performance (PATP). The discrepancy scores for each test were averaged to calculate a
total Metacognitive Pretest Discrepancy Score. A similar calculation procedure was used
to calculate the Metacognitive Posttest Discrepancy Score, again using the same four
executive functions measures (TMT-B, COW AT, SDMT, NAB Judgment).
A similar paradigm was applied to the driving simulator performance as both
discrepancy scores (Metacognitive Pretest, Metacognitive Posttest) were applied to the
individual’s overall T-score performance on the simulator. It is important to note that for
the purposes of these analyses, the Actual Performance T scores for all simulator
variables were derived from mapping the control group’s performances into a normal Tdistribution and converting the stroke groups’ performance into T scores accordingly.
Through this method, the control group’s performance served as the normative sample on
which the stroke survivors’ performance was measured.
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Procedure
Following recruitment, patients and their significant others/caregivers received
and completed an informed consent form (see Appendixes C and D). Before completing
the study, significant others/caregivers completed a brief cognitive screen (MMSE) to
detect possible cognitive dysfunction. Significant others were excluded from further
participation if they failed this screening tool (failure was defined as a score below 25 out
of 30). No individuals were excluded at this point. Due to scheduling restraints, the order
in which the participants completed the neuropsychological testing and driving simulator
varied. However, the order of neuropsychological tests and driving simulator scenarios
was kept consistent across all participants. Due to these scheduling constraints, it was not
possible to counterbalance the administration of the neuropsychological and simulator
measures. Before administration, but following standardized instructions for each
neuropsychological task, the participants were asked to predict their performance by
answering the question “How well do you think you are going to do in comparison to the
average person your age?” (pre-test prediction) while provided with the accompanying
scale (Appendix A). The participants then completed the task and following completion,
they were asked to re-evaluate their performance according to the same scale (post-test
prediction). Participants also completed the driving simulator task and received the
standardized instructions. Before the first scenario, they were asked to predict their
overall driving simulator performance using the same scale as the neuropsychological
measures. It is important to note that all individuals were explicitly informed that their
performance on the driving simulator would have no impact on their driving status. This
was communicated at the time of recruitment, informed consent, and prior to starting the
driving simulator.
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Chapter 3: Results
Sixty-six participant pairs (33 stroke survivors, 33 controls) were involved in the
present study. These participants met all inclusionary criteria. Of the 66 pairs, some
participants were not able to complete all measures for various reasons. For instance,
those individuals who experienced significant aphasia following their stroke were not
able to complete all the neuropsychological measures (COWAT, NAB Judgement). Also,
some participants experienced mild vertigo or dizziness while attempting to complete the
driving simulator and discontinued the task. In these instances, discrepancy score
formulas were adjusted accordingly (i.e., the average scores were calculated using 3,
instead of 4 scores). For the neuropsychological measures, participants had to have
completed at least 2 out of 4 tests to be included in analyses. For the simulator, analyses
were focused on those individuals who completed at least 4 of the 7 scenarios, ensuring
that at least 3 of the same 4 scenarios were examined. After implementing these
limitations, 3 stroke survivors and 2 control participants were eliminated from further
analyses.
Prior to analysis, the data were screened for violations of assumptions associated
with all tests (e.g., normality, linearity, outliers, multicollinearity). This analysis revealed
one control participant who was a multivariate outlier across numerous variables. As
such, this case was eliminated from further analyses. Following all preliminary data
screening, a total of 30 stroke survivors and 30 controls were used in all subsequent
analyses.
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Table 2
Oneway ANOVA comparisons of stroke and control group T scores on

F

Eta2

49.3 (11.4)
(n=30)

24 i ***

.30

27.2(13.3)
(n=28)

46.1 (11.8)
(n=30)

22 2***

.37

COWAT

36.8 (14.6)
(n=28)

49.1 (9.7)
(n=30)

14 5 ***

.21

NAB

43.3 (12.4)
(n=27)

51.9(11.3)
(n=30)

7.5**

.12

Simulator

36.8(17.1)
(n=30)

50.0 (10.0)
(n=30)

16.8***

.22

Measure

Stroke Mean (SD)

Control Mean (SD)

TMT-B

32.9(14.1)
(n=29)

SDMT

Note: TMT-B=Trail Making Test-Part B; SDMT=Symbol Digit Modalities Test;
COWAT=Controlled Oral Word Association Test; NAB =Neuropsychological
Assessment Battery Judgment subtest
Note: *** p < .001; ** p < .01; *p < .05
Independent t tests were conducted to examine whether the stroke and control
groups differed in terms of demographic characteristics (see Table 1), including age and
education. There were no significant differences between the two group in terms of age

(t(58) = 1.97,p = .053) or education level (t(58) = 0.27,p = .79). Table 2 shows the
means and standard deviations of each of the neuropsychological measures for both
groups.
The stroke group performed significantly worse than the control group on all
neuropsychological tests with the greatest difference seen on SDMT and TMT-B. In
terms o f driving simulator overall performance, the stroke group performed significantly
worse than controls.
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Hypothesis 1: Stroke patients will display less self-awareness of deficits than healthy
controls on all measures. For the purpose of this hypothesis, participants’ self-awareness
was examined using two different analyses. First, oneway ANOVAs were conducted on
the Metacognitive Pretest Discrepancy Score (self-awareness prior to feedback) and the
Metacognitive Posttest Discrepancy Score (self-awareness following feedback) to
determine whether the two groups differed significantly in the accuracy of their pre- and
post-test evaluations of performance. It was hypothesized that the stroke group would
demonstrate significantly larger discrepancy scores than the control group. Second,
correlations between their actual performance and their pre-test and post-test ratings, and
pre-post test discrepancies were examined to determine whether an individual’s selfevaluations were related to how well they actually performed (i.e., did those people who
attained higher scores rate themselves accordingly?). Pearson correlations were
performed for all neuropsychological measures, as well the overall performance on the
driving simulator. It was hypothesized that the stroke group would demonstrate lower
correlations between their pre- and post-test ratings and actual performance. Means and
standard deviations for the actual scores, as well as the predicted and postdicted ratings
(in T scores) for both groups are reported in Table 3.
Table 4 shows the oneway ANOVA comparisons between participants’
Metacognitive Pretest Discrepancy Scores (Actual-Predicted) and Metacognitive Posttest
Discrepancy Scores (Actual - Postdicted). It is important to note that because participants’
ratings were subtracted from their actual performance, negative values indicated
overestimation o f performance and positive values represented underestimations. In terms
of the Metacognitive Pretest Discrepancy Scores, significant differences existed between
the stroke survivors and controls across all the neuropsychological measures, with the
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exception of NAB Judgment. The stroke survivors consistently demonstrated significantly
higher overpredictions of their performance than the healthy controls. This pattern was
particularly evident on both the TMT-B and SDMT tests, suggesting that stroke survivors
may demonstrate disporportionate ISA in areas of processing speed and cognitive
flexibility.
Table 3
Actual performance, pre-test and post-test ratines (in T scores') of stroke and control
groups for neuropsychological variables and overall driving simulator performance.

Actual

Stroke Mean (SD)
Predicted Postdicted

Control Mean (SD)
Actual
Predicted Postdicted

TMT-B

32.9(14.1)

49.3 (6.6)

45.6 (8.2)

49.3 (11.4)

51.5 (6.6)

50.4 (6.0)

SDMT

27.2(13.3)

50.6(7.1)

48.4 (7.5)

46.1 (11.8)

52.0 (6.6)

50.7 (6.0)

COWAT

36.8 (14.6) 49.3 (7.1)

45.6 (8.7)

49.1 (9.7)

50.5 (4.9)

49.0 (6.4)

NAB

43.3 (12.4)

52.9 (5.9)

51.9(11.3)

54.4 (6.4)

56.6 (5.8)

Mean NP

34.2 (11.7) 49.5 (5.9) 47.7 (6.3)

49.1 (8.1)

52.1 (5.1)

51.7(4.6)

50.0 (10.0)

54.1 (8.0)

50.2 (5.8)

Simulator 38.0(12.5)

50.3 (6.7)

52.4 (7.5) 47.8 (6.4)

Similar overprediction was observed on simulator performance (see Table 4). The
stroke group showed significantly larger overestimations in their pre-simulator ratings
versus actual performance. In contrast, the control group displayed relatively accurate
predictions o f their performance although they still tended to over-estimate their actual
performance. Across all measures, examination of the means and standard deviations of
the pre-test estimations show the stroke group to rate themselves very similarly to those
individuals who had no history of stroke.
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Table 4
Oneway ANOVA comparisons of Metacognitive Pre-test and Post-test Discrepancy
Scores for stroke survivors and controls on neuropsychological and simulator T scores.
Variable

Stroke Mean (SD)

F

Controls Mean (SD)

Eta2

Actual - Predicted
TMT-B
SDMT
COWAT
NAB
Overall NP
Simulator

-16.3 (14.2)
-23.3 (14.3)
-12.5 (14.3)
-6.9 (12.5)
-15.3 (11.0)
.14.4 (14.4)

-2.3 (10.7)
-6.3 (12.2)
-1.4 (9.6)
-2.4(11.4)
-3.0 (7.7)
-4.1 (9.2)

18.6***
23.3***
12.3**
2.0
25.1***
10.8**

.25
.30
.18
.04
.30
.16

Actual - Postdicted
TMT-B
SDMT
COWAT
NAB
Overall NP
Simulator

-12.6 (10.5)
-21.3 (11.6)
-7.9(10.7)
-9.6(12.5)
13.4 (9.5)
-9.8(11.4)

-1.1 (10.6)
-5.1 (11.7)
0.1 (9.3)
-4.7 (10.6)
-2.6 (7.7)
-0.2 (9.2)

17.5***
27.6***
9 1**

.24
.33
.14
.05
.29
.18

2.6
23.5***
12.7***

Note: *** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05
Because it is clearly more difficult to predict or evaluate one’s performance prior
to actually completing a task (i.e., in the absence of any feedback), the Metacognitive
Posttest Discrepancy Scores were computed to determine whether stroke survivors, even
in the presence of immediate feedback (i.e., completing the task), would demonstrate
continued ISA. This analysis revealed a consistent pattern to that seen in the pre-test
evaluations; that is, the stroke group consistently overpredicted their performance by a
significantly greater margin than the control group on all neuropsychological measures,
with the exception of NAB Judgment. Again, the same pattern emerged in which their
overpredictions were particularly large on measures of processing speed and cognitive
flexibility (TMT-B, SDMT). The stroke survivors also over-predicted their performance
following the simulator more than their healthy counterparts.
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Both groups had a tendency to overestimate their performances across both
neuropsychological and driving measures. Overall, both groups tended to rate themselves
as average in comparison to same-aged peers, which was generally accurate for the
control group but not for the stroke survivors. Overall, the stroke group contained
significantly more individuals who overestimated both before and after their
neuropsychological performance (Pre-test: %2(1,59) = 6.70, p < .01; Post-test: %2(1,59)
= 11.92, p < .001). O f the stroke survivors, approximately two-thirds (67.9%) of them
overpredicted by at least one full standard deviation (10 T-score points) their mean
neuropsychological pre-test predictions and 78.3% of them demonstrated a mean
neuropsychological overestimation of at least 1 standard deviation following the tests. In
contrast, only one third (32.1%) of the control group overestimated their average
performance by one standard deviation prior to the administration and only 21.7% of
them continued to overestimate following completion.
Correlational analyses were used to examine the strength of the relationships
between an individual’s predictions, postdictions, and actual task performance (see Table
5). The control group’s predictions exhibited moderate correlations with actual
performance, with the exception of SDMT and NAB Judgment. Those healthy individuals
who tended to perform better also predicted higher performance prior to testing. In
contrast, the stroke survivors’ pre-test evaluations were statistically unrelated to the level
of actual performance across most of the individual tests and simulator scores (except
FAS). This group, however, displayed a trend in which their predictions varied
consistently with actual performance. Once collapsed into an average neuropsychological
variable, the stroke survivors also demonstrated a positive relationship between their pre-
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test predictions and actual performance. In terms of overall driving performance, the
healthy controls again displayed significant correlations between their predictions and
actual performance, whereas the stroke group’s pre-simulator ratings were not related to
their level of actual performance.
Table 5
Pearson correlations (r) o f the predicted and postdicted ratines, and the predictedpostdicted discrepancy scores with participants’ actual T-score performance in both
stroke and control groups.
Trails B

Predicted
T Score
Postdicted
T Score
Pre-Post

NAB
Judgment

SDMT

Str.

Cont.

FAS
Str.

Mean NP

S im ulator

Str.

Cont.

Str.

Cont.

.21

.40"

.14

.21

.27

.27

.29*

.37*

.41"

.39"

.03

.49*

.67"

.39"

.50"

.26

.23

.38*

.66"

.47"

.59"

.37"

.42*

.42*

-.51”

.05

-.56"

-.03

.08

-.47"

.10

-.32*

.24

-.14

-.47"

Cont.

-.25

Str.

Cont.

Str.

Note: Str. = Stroke survivors; Cont. = Controls
** p < .01; * p < .05
There are several patterns within the correlations between postdicted ratings and
actual performance that suggested that the stroke survivors may have benefited modestly
from feedback during both the neuropsychological and simulator contexts. First,
postdicted ratings were strongly related to actual performance across all
neuropsychological and driving measures, with the exception of NAB Judgment.
Following the completion o f the task, those who performed better also rated themselves
higher and vice versa. Second, in most tasks, the stroke survivors demonstrated larger
correlations between their postdicted ratings and actual performance than between their
predicted ratings and actual performance, suggesting that their accuracy in self-rating
improved with immediate feedback.
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The control group continued to demonstrate significant correlations between their
actual performance and self-evaluations as seen by moderate correlations with postdicted
ratings across both neuropsychological and driving measures. The strength of the
correlations was generally consistent from pre- and post-test ratings.
In terms of the discrepancy between pre-test and post-test self-estimates (pre-post
Discrepancy score), the pattern of correlations showed an interesting trend. There were
significant inverse correlations between actual performance and pre-post discrepancy
scores in the stroke group. As a stroke survivor’s actual performance improved, the
discrepancy between predicted and postdicted ratings decreased; conversely, as a stroke
survivor’s performance was poorer, the discrepancy between predicted and postdicted
ratings increased. Thus, the gap between prediction and postdiction tended to be more
narrow for stroke survivors who did indeed perform relatively well, whereas the gap
between prediction and postdiction tended to widen (show more shift) among survivors
who performed most poorly. Overall, it appears that amount of shift in the survivor’s
awareness was strongly related to their overall performance in both neuropsychological
and driving settings. Especially for survivors who performed poorly, the experience of
actually performing the tasks produced more accurate self-ratings of performance as
compared to prediction. This pattern was not observed in the control group as there were
no significant relationships between the actual performance and pre-post discrepancy
scores. However, since the control group was more accurate to begin with, they required
less shift in their ratings from pre- to post-testing. Unlike the stroke group, the control
group demonstrated a much greater restriction of range in their ratings. In other words,
since most o f them performed within the average range, they had less room to adjust their
self-estimates in order to remain accurate.
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Overall, the results of the first set of analyses strongly support the first hypothesis.
As a group, the stroke survivors demonstrated significantly greater discrepancies between
their estimated and actual performance, both before and after completion of the tasks,
thus indicating clinically significant ISA. Significantly larger proportions of stroke
survivors overestimated their performance by at least one full standard deviation than
healthy controls both pre- and post-testing. Despite this ISA, the correlational analyses
suggest that the stroke group are capable of benefiting from feedback, given substantially
stronger correlations between self-estimates and actual performance at post-testing as
compared to pre-testing. The purpose of Hypothesis 2 was to determine if the stroke
survivors differed significantly from healthy controls in their reaction to feedback.
Hypothesis 2: Stroke patients will show less variation in pre- and post-test selfevaluations (less reaction to feedback) in comparison to controls. For this comparison, the
Metacognitive Pre-Post Discrepancy scores were evaluated. A negative value represented
a higher postdiction (i.e., participants thought they did better than they had predicted after
completion) whereas a positive value meant a lower postdiction (i.e., individuals believed
they did worse than originally predicted). These discrepancies were then averaged and the
two groups were compared via independent t tests. It was hypothesized that the stroke
group would display significantly smaller Pre-Post Discrepancy scores than the control
group.
The two groups did not differ significantly in their pre-post ratings discrepancies
across most measures (see Table 6). When all the neuropsychological measures were
averaged, however, the stroke group displayed significantly more shift in their ratings
(i.e., decreasing their post-test ratings in relation to pre-test ratings) than the controls. In
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general, both groups displayed very little absolute shift in their appraisals following
feedback.
Table 6
Independent t tests comparing Metacognitive Pre-Post Discrepancy Scores for stroke
survivors and control groups.
Variable

Pre - Post
TMT-B
SDMT
COWAT
NAB
Overall NP
Simulator

Stroke Mean
(SD)

Control Mean
(SD)

df

t

p (one-tailed)

3.7 (8.1)
2.2 (5.0)
3.4 (6.4)
-2.7 (5.3)
1.9 (3.3)
4.7 (7.6)

1.1 (5.6)
1.2 (5.6)
1.5 (4.9)
-2.3 (3.3)
0.4 (3.0)
3.9 (6.3)

57
57
55
55
58
58

1.4
0.7
1.3
-0.3
1.9
.42

.08
.25
.10
.38
.03
.34

Because previous analyses revealed the control group to be relatively accurate in
their initial prediction, there was not as much need to significantly alter their post-test
ratings, hence the minimal shift. In contrast, the stroke group’s pre-test predictions were
quite discrepant from their actual performance which left much more opportunity for shift
in ratings. Thus, the degree of initial inaccuracy may have influenced the degree of shift.
To control for this potential confound, the pre-post discrepancy scores were adjusted to
account for baseline predictions (i.e., discrepancy scores were divided by pre-test rating
to calculate a “percentage shift” in rating variable). After accounting for the degree of
“off-prediction” evident during the pre-test ratings, the stroke group continued to show
significantly larger percentage shift in their post-test ratings in their average
neuropsychological performance (1(58) = 2.1, p = .02).
Unlike the neuropsychological composite, the two groups did not differ
significantly in their Metacognitive Pre-Post Discrepancy Scores during the driving
simulator performance (see Table 6). Both groups appeared to benefit from feedback as
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post-simulator ratings were lower than pre-simulator predictions (see Table 3). Overall,
these results did not support the hypothesis that stroke survivors would demonstrate less
variation in their pre-post ratings. The results of this analysis suggest that stroke
survivors’ ability to benefit from feedback may differ depending on the nature of the task,
which was examined by the study’s third hypothesis and analyses.
Hypothesis 3: The stroke group will show a disproportionate unawareness of driving
simulator performance (in comparison to neuropsychological tasks') than controls.
Separate mixed-model ANOVAs each compared the Metacognitive Pre-Test and
Metacognitive Post-Test Discrepancy Scores of the stroke and control groups for overall
driving simulator and overall neuropsychological performance. The between groups
variable was group membership (Stroke versus Controls) whereas the within groups
variable was domain assessed (neuropsychological composite or driving simulator). As
per the hypothesis, it was expected that a main effect would be found for group
membership and domain, as well as a significant interaction between these variables.
In terms of Metacognitive Pre-test Discrepancy Scores, there was a significant
main effect for group (F(l,58) = 25.4,p < .001, r\2 = .31) as the stroke group displayed
significantly larger overpredictions than the controls, a finding consistent with previous
analyses. In contrast, there was no main effect for domain (F( 1,58) = .01, p = .94) as
there was no significant difference between the magnitude of overprediction of the
neuropsychological and simulator performances. As can be seen in Figure 1, the
interaction between group and domain was also not significant (F(l,58) = .35, p = .56) as
the stroke group showed less accurate ratings regardless of domain.
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■ Stroks
Control

Neuropsych

Smulator

Figure 1: The relationship between Metacognitive Pre-test Discrepancy Scores. Group
Membership, and Domain.
Note: The above representations of the Metacognitive Pre-test Discrepancy Scores are in positive values to
display the pattern of over-prediction from actual performance (values closer to 0 represent more accurate
estimations)

In terms of Metacognitive Post-test Discrepancy Scores, a similar pattern
emerged. Again, a significant group main effect was seen (F(1,58) = 24.88,/? < .001, r\2 =
.30) as well as a significant domain main effect (F(l,58) = 4.87,/? < .05, r\ = .08) as the
postdiction discrepancy with actual performance was greater in the stroke group and
significantly higher for the neuropsychological measures. The group X domain
interaction was not significant (F(l,58) = .21,/? = .65) suggesting that the two groups did
not differ significantly in their pattern o f postdiction ratings across domains.
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Figure 2: The relationship between Metacognitive Post-test Discrepancy Scores. Group
Membership, and Domain.
As the final part of the analyses, the Metacognitive Pre-test and Post-test
Discrepancy Score were collapsed into an omnibus mixed model ANOVA. For this
analysis, the between groups variables was group membership while both domain
(neuropsychological versus simulator) and time (pre- versus post-test) were entered as
within subjects variables. As with previous results, there was a large main effect for group
(F(l,58) = 26.54 ,p < .001, r|2 = .31) as the stroke survivors demonstrated higher over
estimations before and after the tests. There was also a large main effect for time (F(l,58)
= 28.88, p < .001, t|2 = .33) as both groups demonstrated significantly larger over
estimations o f their performance prior to testing in comparison to post-test predictions. In
other words, both groups appeared to benefit from the immediate feedback inherent in
completing the tasks and as such their predictions became more accurate. In particular,
both groups showed more accurate postdictions of simulator performance in comparison
to neuropsychological measures as evidenced by a significant domain X time interaction
(F(l,58) = 10.34,/? < .01, r\2 = .16). Contrary to the hypothesis, however, the stroke
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group’s shift in awareness from before to after testing did not differ across domains and
differently than the control group as the test X time X group interaction did not reach
significance (F(l,58) = .145,/? = .70).
Overall, the results of the third analyses did not support the hypothesis. Although
the stroke group displayed significantly from the controls in the accuracy of their ratings,
this pattern did not differ depending on the domain. There was, however, a domain effect
observed as both groups combined showed more accurate ratings of their driving
simulator performance following feedback.
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Chapter 4: Discussion
The purpose of this study was to examine the nature of self-awareness deficits and
how they manifest in driving-related performance following stroke. To investigate the
relationship between self-awareness and driving simulator abilities, the study had stroke
survivors and healthy controls evaluate their performance on various driving simulator
and neuropsychological tasks. By having participants rate familiar driving skills and
novel neuropsychological performance, this study investigated whether self-awareness
changed as a function of the context involved. Consistent with previous research, it was
hypothesized that stroke survivors would demonstrate ISA, defined as significantly larger
discrepancies between their actual and estimated performance (i.e., larger estimated than
actual scores) than healthy controls. Second, it was hypothesized that stroke survivors
would benefit less from immediate feedback than healthy controls as could be observed
by significantly less shift between pre- and post-test self-evaluations. Finally, it was
hypothesized that the nature of ISA within the stroke group would differ as a function of
the context. Given universal self-enhancement biases regarding driving ability, as well the
emotional valence placed on driving ability, it was hypothesized that the stroke group
would show poorer self-awareness on driving simulator performance in comparison to
neuropsychological measures.
The results of this study strongly supported the first hypothesis as the stroke
survivors significantly overestimated their actual performance on almost all
neuropsychological and driving simulator variables. This overestimation was present both
before and after completion of each task and the degree of overestimation was
significantly larger than healthy controls. In general, both groups rated themselves as
average in comparison to their same-aged peers, an appraisal that was accurate for the
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healthy controls but not for the stroke survivors, who generally performed at least one to
two standard deviations below the norm. Clinically, these scores correspond to the mildly
to moderately impaired range in comparison to same-aged peers, the same group to which
they rated themselves. Even after completing the task, almost 4 of every 5 stroke
survivors overestimated their performance by at least one full standard deviation, whereas
only approximately 1 of 5 healthy controls did. The stroke survivors’ ISA was noticeably
greater during tasks involving visuomotor processing speed (e.g., TMT-B, SDMT).
Contrary to the second hypothesis, several analyses revealed that the stroke
survivors were able to benefit from feedback as indicated by significant shift from pre- to
post-test self-ratings of performance. First, the stroke group’s pre-test ratings were not
related to their actual performance whereas post-test ratings were significantly correlated
with actual performance. Second, significant correlations between Pre-Post Discrepancy
scores and actual performance suggest that the stroke survivors that performed better
were able to readjust their self-evaluations more accurately. In other words, the gap
between actual and estimated performance decreased as individuals performed better.
Finally, although there was no significant difference in the amount of shift on each
individual neuropsychological test, the Metacognitive Pre-Post Discrepancy Score for the
neuropsychological composite was significantly larger for the stroke group, indicating
that the stroke group, to some degree, recalibrated (i.e., decreased) their post-test ratings
in comparison to pre-test ratings. Whereas the control group was accurate from the
beginning (and thus requiring little shift following the task), the stroke group was quite
inaccurate prior to the testing, thus allowing much room for improvement in accuracy.
Even when controlling for the degree of initial inaccuracy, this pattern remained
indicating that the stroke group still showed greater response to feedback. It is important
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to note, however, that his improvement was one of relative proportions, as the stroke
group remained significantly inaccurate even following feedback.
Unlike the neuropsychological performance, the stroke survivors did not differ
from the control groups in their ratings shift following feedback from the driving
simulator. In fact, both groups showed a larger shift in their ratings during the simulator
task in comparison to the neuropsychological measures. Although this pattern suggests
that self-awareness differs across contexts, it is not a phenomena exclusive to stroke.
Previous researchers have postulated that affective and motivational factors are just as, if
not more, important than cognitive ones in determining awareness (Flashman &
McAllister, 2002; Marcel, 2004). Therefore, it would be expected that when faced with a
task so relevant to an individual’s independence such as driving, one would display an
emotional defence mechanism precluding one from accurately evaluating one’s abilities.
As such, it was hypothesized that stroke survivors would display less self-awareness of
driving deficits rather than less emotionally-laden neuropsychological tasks. Overall, the
results of the analyses did not support this hypothesis. Although the stroke survivors
exhibited significantly larger overestimations across all domains, there was no difference
in the magnitude o f this overestimation between neuropsychological and driving variables
prior to task completion. On both neuropsychological and driving variables, the stroke
survivors and their healthy counterparts exhibited more accurate ratings following task
completion, thus indicating some ability to benefit from feedback. Contrary to
expectations, this was particularly true of the driving simulator tasks as there was a
significant difference between post-simulator and post-neuropsychological selfevaluations. In other words, both groups were able to benefit from the immediate and
concrete feedback inherent to the driving simulator more so than they could from the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Self-Evaluation of Driving Simulator 59
novel neuropsychological tests. This pattern again suggested that self-awareness may
differ as a result of context or task involved, but this may represent a universal
phenomenon rather than one specific to neurological populations such as stroke.

ISA and Driving Ability Following Stroke
The results of the current study both replicate and expand upon previous research
investigating self-awareness and driving-related performance following stroke. As
expected, the stroke survivors’ performance was significantly lower than healthy controls
across all executive functioning tasks, with most scores in the mildly or moderately
impaired range clinically. This is consistent with previous research that has showed stroke
survivors performing worse on a variety of driving components including reaction time,
visual scanning, information processing speed, distractibility, poor judgement, and
attention deficits (Ball & Owsley, 1992; Engum et al., 1988; Sundet et al., 1995). The
stroke group also performed well below the normative sample in terms of overall driving
simulator performance. This is not surprising given that stroke survivors did poorly on
individual executive tasks and good driving simulator performance requires a higherorder integration and application of these skills in a coordinated and purposeful action,
that in itself which could be considered a critical executive function.
Despite these performance deficits across all domains, the stroke survivors
displayed ISA as they consistently rated themselves as average in comparison to same
aged peers. In fact, their estimations were essentially comparable to a group of
individuals who have never suffered a stroke at all. This level of ISA is consistent with
previous research regardless of how self-awareness has been measured (e.g., self versus
significant other, self versus therapist, actual versus predicted performance). The findings
from this study support the results found by Marcel and colleagues (2004) who used a
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similar actual versus predicted performance paradigm to examine the self-awareness of
stroke patients on a verbal fluency and mental flexibility task. Overall, the patients that
demonstrated more severe neuropsychological impairments were also more likely to show
more ISA (i.e., higher overestimations). Most patients were more accurate in their post
test ratings in comparison to pre-test ratings. From this pattern, the researchers concluded
that accurate awareness o f deficit required some calibration based on direct personal
experience with the deficit and a special type of mental flexibility that allowed for
adjustment of behaviour based on experience. The results of this study replicate these
findings as the correlational analyses revealed that those stroke survivors who achieved
higher actual performance across most measures also showed more accurate postdictions
and the most potential to benefit from feedback given lower pre-post discrepancies. Those
who performed worse also showed higher levels of ISA. Consistent with Marcel’s theory
of the importance of mental flexibility in predicting self-awareness, the stroke group, who
showed greater ISA, also showed significantly lower performance on neuropsychological
measures of mental flexibility (TMT-B) during the present study.
The results of this study, as well as Marcel’s conclusions, are consistent with
previous metacognitive and cognitive psychological theory. Although both groups
demonstrated general self-enhancement bias, the ISA exhibited by the stroke survivors in
the current study cannot be explained by this alone as the degree of overestimation was
significantly larger than the normal controls. It is probable that individuals who have
suffered neurological injury lack several of the cognitive processes needed to accurately
rate their performance. O f these, mental flexibility and adjustment skills may be of
particular interest. According to the anchoring-and-adjustment heuristic proffered by
Tversky and Kahneman (1974), one way to make judgements under uncertainty is to
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anchor on previous information that comes to mind and adjust until a plausible estimate is
reached; therefore, either inaccurate initial anchors or insufficient adjustment commonly
invoke judgemental bias. Within this framework, it has been proposed that initial
information tends to exert undue influence on subsequent adjustment processes, leaving
final estimates too close to the original anchor (Epley & Gilovich, 2006). Therefore, it is
possible, that following a neurological event such as stroke, an individual uses their
previous driving experience as the anchor on which they base their post-stroke ratings. In
other words, if an individual considered himself or herself to be either an average or
above average driver prior to their stroke, this preconceived anchor would bias one’s
ability to adjust one’s ratings according to new information (i.e., stroke sequelae) and as a
result the individual would continue to himself or herself as average or above.
Although the anchoring-and-adjustment heuristic appears to be a universal
phenomenon, it is very probable that neurological injuries that hinder one’s cognitive
flexibility, such as stroke, would demonstrate an exaggerated pattern. Similar to
inaccurate initial anchors, insufficient adjustment may also help explain the presentation
of ISA observed during the present study. Consistent with the theories implicating
decreased mental flexibility in ISA, it is probable that stroke survivors have more
difficulty with the complicated and effortful assessment required to adjust from selfratings. Recent research has shown that people adjust insufficiently from an initial anchor
value because they stop adjusting once their adjustments fall within an implicit range of
plausible values (Epley & Gilovich, 2006). This would explain why the stroke group,
despite poor performance, rated themselves within the average range of abilities in
comparison to same-aged peers, as average is where most individuals fall across most
domains. Finally, it is possible that stroke survivors, in general, lack the ability to make
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accurate estimates about ambiguous information regardless of whether the information
pertains to themselves or others. This is consistent with previous research that suggests
that stroke survivors perform significantly worse on measures of cognitive estimation
(Scott et al., 2007).
Previous studies have revealed contradictory results pertaining to the nature of
self-awareness deficits across different domains or contexts. Some researchers have
reported that following stroke, some individuals exhibit the largest overestimations during
motor-based tasks, while rating themselves as more impaired on cognitive and emotional
variables (Gauggel et al., 2000). In contrast, Prigatano and colleagues (1990) reported
greater ISA in traumatic brain injury survivors of social interaction skills, emotional
control, and cognitive tasks in comparison to physical activities and basic self-care in
which individuals were more accurate. Fischer et al. (2004) reported that individuals who
had suffered a stroke only overestimated their performance on memory testing whereas
simple motor tasks (i.e., finger tapping) were rated accurately. These discrepancies could
be explained by the fact that physical limitations and basic self care disabilities are readily
recognizable deficits that allow for direct observation (e.g., hemiplegia, not being able to
dress oneself) whereas more cognitively based deficits, such as memory and processing
speed are more subtle. O f the cognitive-based deficits, executive functioning tasks, in
particular, have been reported to be the most strongly related to ISA (Burgess et al., 1998)
and as such, were chosen to be used in the current study. By using the tests most related
self-awareness, it would allow for a better comparison of whether self-awareness does
fluctuate depending on the nature of the task involved.
The current study supports the notion that ISA may be prominent during abstract
and cognitive-based tasks as stroke survivors showed ISA on almost all the executive
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functioning tasks, even after feedback. The areas that the stroke survivors demonstrated
the most ISA were on tasks that required visual scanning, cognitive flexibility, and
processing speed (TMT-B and SDMT) and it remained quite resilient even after feedback.
The lack of awareness within these domains is particularly problematic given that these
tasks are consistently found to be some of the most predictive of on-road performance and
driving skills (Hopewell, 2002; Mazer et al., 1998; Schanke & Sundet, 2000; Sundet et
al., 1995).
The results of the current study provide insight into the manifestations of driving
awareness following stroke as much of the previous research has investigated the
relationship between driving and stroke, or self-awareness and stroke, but has not
systematically investigated all three factors. Whereas the ISA associated with
neuropsychological deficits may result from the fact that they are subtle and not easily
detected by an individual, driving ability provides a more concrete indicator of abilities.
Despite this, the stroke survivors still showed very inaccurate estimations of their abilities
in this context as well. Previous studies have shown individuals with neurological
impairments, such as TBI, to perform significantly worse on driving simulators than
healthy controls (Lew et al., 2005). Whereas some researchers have suggested that stroke
survivors are capable of making accurate judgements about driving ability (Golper et al.,
1980), others have reported the opposite (Hartje et al., 1991). Fisk and colleagues
reported that 30% o f stroke survivors resumed driving following stroke, although less
than 10% sought out any formal evaluation of driving skills, suggesting the possibility of
poor insight into driving -related deficits. The results of the present study help clarify
these controversial findings by showing that most stroke survivors have very poor
awareness of driving deficits following their injuries. Since the stroke group consisted of
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both drivers and non-drivers (approximately 2:1, respectively), it appears that the ISA
exists regardless o f actual driving exposure, which is particularly disconcerting. However,
this is consistent with previous reports (Coleman et al., 2002) that have shown no
differences in perception of driving abilities between those individuals who have and
have not resumed driving following neurological injury. The level of ISA for driving
ability displayed by the present stroke group is also consistent with findings suggesting
that awareness of one’s driving limitations to be unrelated to objective driving records
and direct evidence accidents (Marottoli & Richardson, 1998). Unlike this research, the
current study did reveal that stroke survivors, similar to the general population, are
capable of benefiting from the type of feedback inherent to driving simulator exposure, a
phenomenon not previously detected by earlier self-awareness measures. The temporal
stability of such benefit, however, has yet to be determined.

Metacognitive Discrepancy Scores and ISA
Clearly, the results of the current study show the use of the Metacognitive
Discrepancy scores as valid measures of self-awareness. While the current findings are
consistent with previous research implementing this technique (Ergh, 2004; Marcel et al.,
2004), it is important to note that they also reveal similar conclusions about the
manifestations o f ISA using other methodologies, suggesting a promising degree of
concurrent validity. One of the most often used indices of ISA has been examining the
discrepancy between a patient’s self-ratings and the ratings of that patient’s significant
other, caregiver, or health professional/therapist. The ISA demonstrated during the
current study is commensurate with previous studies that have found stroke survivors
significantly and continually over-rate their performance in comparison to their
therapist’s rating of the same domain (Hartman-Maeir et al., 2003). As it pertains to
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driving, previous studies (Coleman et al., 2002) have shown that patients’ perceptions of
their abilities did not differ between groups of individuals who had and had not returned
to driving. In contrast, significant others’ ratings of abilities were significantly different
between driver and non-drivers and only the significant other’s rating of the patient’s
fitness to drive made any significant contribution to the prediction of driving status.
Similarly, in a recent study by Scott and colleagues (2007), stroke survivors showed
disproportionate overestimations of driving ability in comparison to healthy counterparts
when asked about rating their driving performance. Interestingly, stroke survivors
exhibited more accurate self-appraisals when different frame of references were used. In
other words, when asked to compare themselves to their significant other, stroke
survivors rated themselves lower than if comparing themselves to the general population.
This pattern suggests that a concrete and tangible frame of reference may play a role in
eliciting self-awareness. This is consistent with the present findings showing that both
stroke survivors and healthy controls showed more accurate self-ratings following driving
simulator performance. Overall, the results of the current study expand upon previous
findings by showing that overestimations of driving ability in stroke survivors occur, not
only in subjective comparisons, but also in more objective actual versus prediction
paradigms.

Clinical Implications
In terms of clinical and practical implications, this study contributes to the current
knowledge surrounding rehabilitation of deficits following stroke and the use of driving
simulators as an effective rehabilitation tool. The current study has expanded on the
present literature by providing a sensitive and valid indicator o f self-awareness of deficit.
Past research has utilized self-reports or significant other opinions as a basis of
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evaluation. Unlike these previous attempts that rely solely on subjective reports, the use
of the Metacognitive Discrepancy scores allows for an objective comparison between an
individual’s actual and estimated performance. The use of significant other reports has
been proven to be a very effective tool in the accurate evaluation of cognitive and
behavioural deficits (Coleman et al., 2002), particularly when it comes to activities of
daily living, such as driving. This measurement approach has its shortcomings, however,
with perhaps the most important being the difficulty in being fully objective when one’s
decision may have significant consequences for their life as well. For instance, for an
elderly couple in which the stroke survivor was the only one of the pair who had a valid
driver’s license, asking the significant other to objectively evaluate their ability to drive
would carry with it significant consequences to the couple’s independence. As such, it
would not be surprising if the significant other provided a less critical account of driving
ability, even when faced with evidence to the contrary. In addition, asking the significant
other to be the gatekeeper to their partner’s independence could easily lead to marital
conflict and undue stress, both of which would be detrimental to the recovery process and
psychosocial functioning. The use of actual versus predicted performance paradigms
takes the responsibility away from the significant other while still providing a reliable
index of one’s abilities. In fact, this approach is ideal in a neuropsychological and
rehabilitation setting because it allows for an objective evaluation of actual
neuropsychological functioning as well as an evaluation of insight into one’s deficits,
both of which are significantly predictive of rehabilitation outcome and prognosis.
The introduction of a Pre-Post Metacognitive Discrepancy score in the current
study also has several clinical advantages. It is possible that the type of ISA differs
depending on whether an individual is asked to predict performance either before or after
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testing. Pre-test self-evaluations can give the clinician a broad sense of global awareness
of deficit. For instance, most neuropsychological test instructions provide the individual
with an idea of what they are going to be asked to do and also the skills involved (i.e., on
timed tasks, individuals are often instructed to work as fast as they can because the
examiner is timing their performance). As such, if an individual who has suffered a brain
injury has insight into their slower processing, it is expected that they will predict lower
performance. If the individual continues to predict average or above average skills, it may
indicate the potential presence of ISA.
However, isolated reliance on pre-test discrepancy scores is problematic as many
individuals, regardless of neurocognitive functioning, find it difficult to predict
performance on a task with which they have no previous experience to anchor their
expectations. The use o f post-test discrepancy scores will help reduce this confound as the
person will experience the task and use this experience as a concrete basis of feedback as
to how they do and if they notice any struggles. Again, however, this alone will not allow
for a comprehensive representation of one’s self-awareness. If the client is asked to
evaluate their performance both before and after the task, a Metacognitive Pre-Post
Discrepancy score allows a clinician to examine how, if at all, the client can respond to
feedback and demonstrate the mental flexibility and openness needed to accurately
appreciate one’s true abilities. ISA is one of the biggest detriments to successful
rehabilitation as it is often difficult to treat symptoms that are not perceived to exist.
Similarly, if a client is not capable, for whatever reason, of benefiting from feedback or
direct evidence of deficits, that will greatly hinder remediation techniques. Therefore, the
introduction of a Metacognitive Pre-Post Discrepancy score can offer very important
quantitative and qualitative information about an individual’s suitability for rehabilitation
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efforts, and optimally, may act as an indicator of future rehabilitation success. It can also
be used serially which could be used as a marker of improved self-awareness and
rehabilitation efficacy. However, it is important to note that although increased selfawareness of deficits carries long term benefits to an individual’s integration back into
their life, it can have short term consequences to one’s emotional and psychological
functioning. Whereas an individual previously oblivious to his or her own deficits does
not experience much distress about functioning, bringing awareness to such deficits can
have a negative impact on the client’s self-esteem, coping, and general mood. It is
imperative that when clinicians are attempting to rehabilitate ISA, a multifaceted
approach is used, with the inclusion of supportive individual and/or family psychotherapy
or counselling.
Although the use of Metacognitive Discrepancy scores allow for a standardized
assessment and identification of ISA, they, in themselves, do not act as a rehabilitation
intervention tool. In contrast, the driving simulator is capable of doing such work and the
results of the current study suggest that it has the potential to do so effectively. With the
advent o f more sophisticated virtual technology, current driving simulators provide a
vastly more realistic and ecologically valid index of abilities over their predecessors (e.g.,
simple brake and gas pedal reaction time lab tests). With this improved technology, it is
possible that higher-order driving deficits not previously detected by simplistic
operational research measures would become more obvious with such driving simulator
assessments. These advantages over earlier technologies may help provide stroke
survivors, along with other neurologically impaired individuals, with concrete feedback
and evidence about their abilities to cope with the demands of driving. At the same time,
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they remain a safer option than on-road examinations when neuropsychological measures
suggest that cognitive functioning may be compromised.
Despite the promising results of the driving simulator use in rehabilitation and
retraining of driving skills, it is possible that individuals will still demonstrate a great deal
of unawareness of deficits, or denial of difficulties when it comes to their driving skills.
Although the present study demonstrated stroke survivors’ ability to benefit from the
feedback inherent to the simulator, the temporal stability of this benefit and adjustment
has yet to be determined. It is possible, that over longer periods of time, once removed
from the immediate feedback, stroke survivors would continue to show very resilient ISA
and very little residual shift in their self-appraisals. Consistent with this hypothesis,
Marottoli and Richardson (1998) found older drivers’ confidence and self-awareness of
driving skill were unrelated to objective evidence of driving ability such as history of
adverse driving events (e.g., accidents). Again, this is consistent with the seemingly
universal phenomenon of self-enhancement bias (Delhomme, 1991), a pattern also
observed in the current study as the majority of individuals, regardless of injury history,
rated themselves at least average, if not above average on driving simulator performance.
It is also consistent with the aforementioned anchoring-and-adjustment heuristic (Tversky
& Kahneman, 1974). However, as will be discussed below, the nature and resiliency of
self-awareness of driving deficits may differ depending on whether the person is
participating in an actual on-road test or on a less realistic driving simulator.

Limitations to the Present Study
This study was limited by several methodological issues. Although the study
benefited from a relatively racially and demographically diverse sample, a larger clinical
sample size is needed to replicate and generalize the current findings. The heterogeneous
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stroke group may have also limited the specificity of the findings as the study did not
contain any consistent index of stroke severity. The small sample size did not allow for a
separation and direct comparison of left- versus right-sided stroke to determine whether a
consistent lateralization pattern emerged. Given the unequal representation of patients
with left- versus right-sided strokes in this study, it is possible that the sample resulted
from a referral bias, with left-sided stroke survivors (with significant language issues)
presenting in a rehabilitation setting more often than right-sided stroke survivors (with
less obvious deficits). Following stroke, there is a natural recovery slope in terms of
cognitive and physical functioning. As such, the nature of ISA may differ over the course
of recovery. The current study contained a very large chronicity range that, although
lends support for the general robustness of the current findings, does not make it possible
to delineate how time since injury may affect self-awareness of driving ability. However,
it is worth noting that previous research has suggested that individuals who have suffered
a stroke remain inaccurate in their assessment of the impact the stroke has had on their
life long after the acute phase of recovery and that time since injury is not a significant
predictor of self-awareness (Hibbard et al., 1992). Similarly, a direct comparison of stroke
survivors who had and had not resumed driving was not completed. However, recent
research has shown that regardless of actual driving status, stroke survivors continue to
rate themselves as average or above average in comparison to other drivers (Scott et a l,
2007). Finally, the current study did not include an evaluation o f how emotional and
psychological sequelae play a role in ISA. Mood issues like depression, are generally
accepted as influencing an individual’s perception of themselves and their world.
The very recent use o f more sophisticated driving simulator mechanisms has
many advantages for future research and the ecological validity of research findings.
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However, because of the novelty of the particular driving simulator used in this study,
large standardizations have not been conducted. This forced the use of a relatively small
number of normal healthy controls to serve as our normative population on which T
scores were based. Although driving simulators are a significant advance in driving
research, even the most sophisticated virtual driving simulators cannot match the inherent
demands of on-road evaluations. Although the driving simulator used in this study was
used to simulate a familiar and in most instances a fairly automatized task, involvement in
this simulation task was novel to most, if not all, of the participants. It is still possible that
self-awareness differs depending on the familiarity of, or the importance one places on, a
task, a hypothesis best tested using actual on-road driving situations. Stroke survivors
may be more likely to recognize shortcomings or changes in performance when faced
with a task that they have done for a long time and have a good baseline for comparison
(i.e., actual on-road driving) since they cannot attribute difficulties to factors associated
with the simulator themselves.

Directions for Future Research
This study serves as a foundation for future research examining the nature of selfawareness, driving after stroke, and simulator use. Previous research has been
contradictory with regards to the hemispheric asymmetry of self-awareness deficits with
some studies favouring a lateralization effect (Anderson & Tranel, 1989; Hartmann-Maeir
et al., 2002; Marcel et al., 2004) whereas others do not (Hartmann-Maeir et al, 2003;
Hibbard, Gordon, Stein, Grober, & Sliwinski, 1992). It is possible that these disparate
findings result from divergent definitions and measurement of self-awareness, as well as
the differing contexts or abilities that have been evaluated. Using the current
methodology to compare left- versus right-sided strokes may help to determine if, and to
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what degree, hemispheric asymmetries exist. Similarly, further comparison of groups by
other stroke (i.e., time post injury, severity, and presence of comorbid mood issues) and
demographic characteristics (i.e., age, gender, and education level) would enlighten
further the nature of self-awareness deficits and how they affect driving resumption.
Previous research has been inconclusive as to how variables such as age and gender
influence driving self-evaluations among the normal population (Finn & Bragg, 1986;
Marcel et al., 2004). Similarly, there is a strong possibility that demographic variables,
such as age and gender, may affect the match between user and technology. In other
words, younger males may already be more comfortable and adept at video games and
other similar technologies which would affect their performance on driving simulators.
It appears that self-awareness partly depends on the context or skill involved
regardless o f neurocognitive functioning. Whereas this study focused on driving
simulator and neuropsychological performance, future research can begin to examine
other contexts or abilities that may be differentially affected by ISA. Following stroke,
many individuals are faced with the challenge of reintegrating into work, home, and
community. Insight into how one is handling the demands of their job, social settings, and
relationships, is crucial to successful return to premorbid functioning. Research
examining survivors’ self-awareness in these areas would be very clinically relevant and
would greatly aid rehabilitation efforts. By the same token, the current self-awareness
paradigm could be applied to other clinical and neurological populations like traumatic
brain injury, Alzheimer’s disease, and depression.
Although the current Metacognitive Discrepancy scores demonstrated promising
results, future research would be useful in further determining the most effective
presentation of this paradigm. For instance, the current study asked individuals to rate
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themselves in comparison to same-aged peers. Although this allows for the most direct
comparison to actual performance, cognitive psychology theory suggests that it may serve
to bias individual’s responses toward rating themselves as average. If individuals were
asked to rate themselves in comparison to a more concrete frame of reference, such as
their significant other, this may elicit more accurate ratings, as suggested by previous
research (Scott et al., 2007). Also, participants were asked to make very general
estimations based on overall performance. This requires an accurate estimation and
integration of various aspects of any given task, a complex process perhaps too
demanding for stroke survivors. Instead, if stroke survivors were asked to rate themselves
on several discrete variables, they may demonstrate improved self-awareness. For
example, instead of asking them to rate their overall driving performance, a clinician may
ask the individual to rate how fast they were driving or how well they obeyed traffic
signs. Finally, stroke survivors may show improved self-awareness of deficits if you ask
them to rate themselves to how they believed they would have performed prior to their
injury. It is possible some of the stroke survivors in this study considered themselves
superior drivers prior to their injury and by rating themselves as average, are admitting
some decline in performance. By asking them to use themselves as a direct frame of
reference, clinicians may elicit a more accurate picture of ISA. Despite the over
predictions, it would be beneficial for future research to delineate how much stroke
survivors’ over-estimations are due to context-specific ISA or more general cognitive
estimation deficits that hinder their ability to accurately evaluate ambiguous information.
This study was conducted within the context of a larger longitudinal investigation
of driving resumption following stroke, including standardized on-road evaluations. The
inclusion of on-road assessments will lead to various avenues for future research. For
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instance, similar self-awareness investigations can be conducted with on-road
performance as this will serve as a more familiar context than the driving simulator.
Knowing the abilities of ISA and driving simulator performance to successfully predict
on-road performance would be important in determining rehabilitation approaches.
Previous research has been unclear as to the utility of driving simulators to predict on
road performance (Keller et al., 2003; Lew et al., 2005; Monga, 1997; Nouri & Tinson,
1988; Owsley, 1997) but have been greatly limited by the primitive nature of the driving
simulators themselves (e.g., consisting of simple green light acceleration and red light
braking reaction time). If the newer and more sophisticated simulators prove to be
significantly predictive of on-road success and safety, then these instruments and methods
may begin to be used as sensitive and cost-effective screens for fitness to drive.
Finally, this study has contributed to a new line of research looking at the utility of
driving simulators as a rehabilitation and assessment tool. It appears from this study that
the simulator can elicit some improvement in the accuracy of self-ratings as seen by
stronger relationships between postdicted ratings and actual performance than between
predicted ratings and actual performance. Future research could further investigate
whether driving simulators may be used as a method of improving self-awareness of
deficit and serving as a retraining tool for basic driving skills as they provide immediate
feedback to the individual in a safe yet ecologically valid setting. To do so, repeated
administrations of simulator training sessions and accompanying pre and post selfevaluations would allow for an examination of learning slopes and self-evaluations with
increased exposure to driving tasks prior to going on the road. This line of research would
also allow the examination of the temporal stability of improved self-awareness as a
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result of simulator use. In other words, do the acute changes seen in this study translate
into longer term improvements in self-awareness?

Conclusions
In conclusion, this study replicates the findings from previous research stating that
stroke survivors, regardless of context, consistently demonstrate ISA. Clinically, this
presentation clearly requires a health practitioner to avoid basing prognostic or
rehabilitation decisions on the client’s report alone. Instead, the use of Metacognitive
Discrepancy scores would provide valid measures of self-awareness and ability to benefit
from feedback in neurologically impaired individuals. Finally, the results of the current
study suggest that driving simulators allow for a safe and effective way to assess driving
skills in individuals wishing to resume driving. Perhaps even more importantly, they can
act as a critical intervention tool for improving driving skills themselves, as well as
eliciting improved self-awareness of deficit. Self-awareness remains a critical moderating
variable between neurocognitive impairment and functional outcome in the community.
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Appendix A

METACOGNITIVE RATING SCALE
INTRODUCTION OF METACOGNITIVE RATING SCALE:

We will be using this rating scale (HAND PATIENT THE RATING SCALE) for the next few tasks. I
want to first make sure you know how to u se it I will ask you to rate how well you think you will do
on several tasks compared to other healthy people your age. This is a scale is similar to the grading
scale used for most classrooms, where below 50 indicates extreme difficulty performing the task
and above 100 indicates extreme ease performing the task. For example, if you think you would
perform like most healthy people, i.e., you will give the equivalent of a “C” performance then you
would give me a number between 70 and 80. The lower the numbers correspond with poorer
performance and the higher numbers correspond with better performance. So if you think you might
have som e difficulty with the task, i.e., you think you would do worse than other healthy people your
age, maybe a “D” performance, then you would give me a number between 60 and 70. If you think
that you would do really well on the task compared to healthy people your age, i.e., you would do
much better than people your age and maybe score an “A”, then you would give me a number
between 90 and 100.
So if you thought you would perform like most other healthy people your age what number would
you give me? _ (NUMBER SHOULD BE BETWEEN 70 - 80)
What about if you thought you would have a lot of difficulty with the task and do much w orse then
others your age, what number would you give me?
(NUMBER SHOULD BE BETWEEN 5 0 - 6 0 )
What about if you thought you would do extremely well on the task, i.e., do extremely better than
almost everyone your age, what number would you give me?
(NUMBER SHOULD BE
BEWTWEEN 100 -1 10 )
Interviewer note: Make sure the respondent was able to use the scale before proceeding.

II
40

II

50

II

60

II

70

II

80

100

90

110

F-

F

D

C

B

A

A+

Extremely
Worse

Much Worse

Worse

Same

Better

Much Better

Extremely
Better

PRE-TASK RATING
FOLLOWING THE STANDARDIZED ADMINISTRATION OF TASK INSTRUCTIONS, THE PARTICIPANT
RA TES H O W WELL SHE BELIEVES SHE WILL PERFORM COMPARED TO OTHERS HER AGE.

Use the rating scale to indicate how well do you think you will perform on this task compared to
healthy people your age? Did you think you would score in the lower range of that category, e.g.,
like a ( USE LETTER GRADE) minus, the upper range, e.g., like a (USE LETTER GRADE) plus, or right
in the middle, e.g., like a (USE LETTER GRADE)?
TH E T A S K IS T H E N A D M IN IST E R E D .

POST-TASK RATING
FOLLOWING THE TASK PARTICIPANTS RATE HO W WELL THEY BELIEVED THEY PERFORMED.

Use the rating scale to indicate how well you think you performed on the task compared to healthy
people your age? Did you think you would score in the lower range o f that category, e.g., like a (USE
LETTER GRADE) minus, the upper range, e.g., like a (USE LETTER GRADE) plus, or right in the middle,
e.g., like a (USE LETTER GRADE)?
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Appendix B
Conversion o f Patient Ratings to T-Score Equivalents
Patient Rating: Extremely Worse (40 through 49) - Moderately to Severely
Impaired
IF RATING < 40 T-SCORE EQUIV = 29.5.
IF RATING = 40 T-SCORE EQUIV = 30.
IF RATING = 41 T-SCORE EQUIV = 30.5.
IF RATING = 42 T-SCORE EQUIV = 31.
IF RATING = 43 T-SCORE EQUIV = 31.5.
IF RATING = 44 T-SCORE EQUIV = 32.
IF RATING = 45 T-SCORE EQUIV = 32.5.
IF RATING = 46 T-SCORE EQUIV = 33.
IF RATING = 47 T-SCORE EQUIV = 33.5.
IF RATING = 48 T-SCORE EQUIV = 34.
IF RATING = 49 T-SCORE EQUIV = 34.5
Patient Rating: Much Worse 150 through 59) - Mildly Impaired
IF RATING = 50 T-SCORE EQUIV = 35.
IF RATING = 51 T-SCORE EQUIV = 35.5.
IF RATING = 52 T-SCORE EQUIV = 36.
IF RATING = 53 T-SCORE EQUIV = 36.5.
IF RATING = 54 T-SCORE EQUIV = 37.
IF RATING = 55 T-SCORE EQUIV = 37.5.
IF RATING = 56 T-SCORE EQUIV = 38.
IF RATING = 57 T-SCORE EQUIV = 38.5.
IF RATING = 58 T-SCORE EQUIV = 39.
IF RATING = 59 T-SCORE EQUIV = 39.5
Patient Rating: Worse (60 through 69) - Low Average
IF RATING = 60 T-SCORE EQUIV = 40.
IF RATING = 61 T-SCORE EQUIV = 40.5.
IF RATING = 62 T-SCORE EQUIV = 41.
IF RATING = 63 T-SCORE EQUIV = 41.5.
IF RATING = 64 T-SCORE EQUIV = 42.
IF RATING = 65 T-SCORE EQUIV = 42.5.
IF RATING = 66 T-SCORE EQUIV = 43.
IF RATING = 67 T-SCORE EQUIV = 43.5.
IF RATING = 68 T-SCORE EQUIV = 44.
IF RATING = 69 T-SCORE EQUIV = 44.5
Patient Rating: Same (70 through 791 - Average
IF RATING = 70 T-SCORE EQUIV = 45.
IF RATING = 71 T-SCORE EQUIV = 46.
IF RATING = 72 T-SCORE EQUIV = 47.
IF RATING = 73 T-SCORE EQUIV = 48.
IF RATING = 74 T-SCORE EQUIV = 49.
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IF
IF
IF
IF
IF

RATING
RATING
RATING
RATING
RATING

= 75 T-SCORE
= 76 T-SCORE
= 77 T-SCORE
= 78 T-SCORE
= 79 T-SCORE

EQUIV
EQUIV
EQUIV
EQUIV
EQUIV

= 50.
= 51.
= 52.
= 53.
= 54.

Patient Rating: Better (80 through 89) - Above Average
IF RATING = 80 T-SCORE EQUIV = 55.
IF RATING = 81 T-SCORE EQUIV = 55.5.
IF RATING = 82 T-SCORE EQUIV = 56.
IF RATING = 83 T-SCORE EQUIV = 56.5.
IF RATING = 84 T-SCORE EQUIV = 57.
IF RATING = 85 T-SCORE EQUIV = 57.5.
IF RATING = 86 T-SCORE EQUIV = 58.
IF RATING = 87 T-SCORE EQUIV = 58.5.
IF RATING = 88 T-SCORE EQUIV = 59.
IF RATING = 89 T-SCORE EQUIV = 59.5
Patient Rating: Much Better (90 through 991 - Superior
IF RATING = 90 T-SCORE EQUIV = 60.
IF RATING = 91 T-SCORE EQUIV = 60.5.
IF RATING = 92 T-SCORE EQUIV = 61.
IF RATING = 93 T-SCORE EQUIV = 61.5.
IF RATING = 94 T-SCORE EQUIV = 62.
IF RATING = 95 T-SCORE EQUIV = 62.5.
IF RATING = 96 T-SCORE EQUIV = 63.
IF RATING = 97 T-SCORE EQUIV = 63.5.
IF RATING = 98 T-SCORE EQUIV = 64.
IF RATING = 99 T-SCORE EQUIV = 64.5.
Patient Rating: Extremely Better MOO through 110) - Very Superior
IF RATING = 100 T-SCORE EQUIV = 65.
IF RATING = 101 T-SCORE EQUIV = 65.5.
IF RATING = 102 T-SCORE EQUIV = 66.
IF RATING = 103 T-SCORE EQUIV = 66.5.
IF RATING = 104 T-SCORE EQUIV = 67.
IF RATING = 105 T-SCORE EQUIV = 67.5.
IF RATING = 106 T-SCORE EQUIV = 68.
IF RATING = 107 T-SCORE EQUIV = 68.5.
IF RATING = 108 T-SCORE EQUIV = 69.0.
IF RATING = 109 T-SCORE EQUIV = 69.5.
IF RATING = 110 T-SCORE EQUIV = 70.
IF RATING > 110 T-SCORE EQUIV = 70.5.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Self-Evaluation of Driving Simulator 90
Appendix C
INFORMED CONSENT FORM

Principal Investigator: Lisa J. Rapport, Ph.D.
Introduction and P u rp o s e :
Research is being conducted at Wayne State University to examine recovery of
independent functioning after stroke. The purpose of this study is to collect
information about the best predictors of recovery of function and assessment of
driving status after stroke. I am being asked to take part in this research study
because I am an adult aged 18 years or older and I had a stroke.
P ro c ed u re :
If I take part in this study, I will be asked to answer questions about my recovery
since my stroke. I will be asked to complete questionnaires. If I seek to resume
driving, I may also be asked to complete a computerized driving evaluation at the
School of Allied Health and Pharmacy. As an additional component of this study,
I realize that my medical and driving records may be obtained and only will be
used for the purposes of this study. I understand that a significant other such as
a family member also may be contacted to participate in the study and provide
information about my recovery.
R isk s:
There are no expected risks from participating in this study. Some people may
experience temporary frustration from some of the testing that will be done. In
the unlikely event of any injury resulting from this research, no reimbursement,
compensation, or free medical treatment is offered by the Detroit Medical Center
or Wayne State University.
B enefits:
There will be no direct benefit for me for taking part in this study. Analysis of the
information will increase awareness of the best ways to assess driving ability and
may help more people who have sustained strokes resume the activities they did
before the stroke, including safe driving.
C o st of Participation:
There will be no additional cost to me or my insurance carrier for participation in
this study.
C om pensation:
I will be paid $25 when I complete the questionnaires. If I participate in the driving
simulator evaluation, I will be paid an additional $25.
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Voluntary Participation/W ithdraw al:
My participation is entirely voluntary. I can refuse participation at any time.
Refusal to participate will not affect the treatment I receive now or in the future. I
can decide to withdraw from the study at any time. My decision will not change
the present or future health care or other services that I receive.
Confidentiality:
All information that is collected for this study will be kept entirely confidential. I
will be identified in the research records by a code number. Information that
identifies me personally will not be released without my written permission. Any
presentation or publication based on the results from this study will not identify
me by name or otherwise.
Q uestions: If I have any questions regarding this study or my participation in it,
now or in the future, I can contact Dr. Lisa Rapport at (313) 577-2800 or Dr.
Renee Coleman at (313) 745-9763. If I have any questions regarding my rights
as a research subject, I can contact the Chairman of the Behavioral Investigation
Committee at (313) 577-1628.
C o n se n t to P articipate in R esearch Study: I have read or had read to me all of
the above information about this research study, including the research
procedure, possible risks, and the costs and benefits to me. The content and
meaning of this information was explained. All of my questions have been
answered to my satisfaction. I hereby consent and voluntarily offer to follow the
study requirements and take part in this study. I will receive a signed copy of this
consent form.

Signature of Study Subject

Date

Printed Name of Study Subject/Patient

Date

Signature o f Legally Authorized Representative

Date

Relationship to Subject

Signature of Witness

Date

Signature of Investigator/Designee Obtaining Informed Consent

Date
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Appendix D
INFORMED CONSENT FORM FOR CAREGIVER/SIGNIFICANT OTHER

Principal Investigator: Lisa J. Rapport, Ph.D.
Introduction an d P u rp o s e :
Research is being conducted at Wayne State University to examine recovery of
independent functioning after stroke. The purpose of this study is to collect
information about the best predictors of recovery of function and assessment of
driving status after stroke. I am being asked to take part in this research study
because I am an adult aged 18 years or older and my significant other had a
stroke.
P ro ced u re:
If I take part in this study, I will be asked to answer questions about my significant
other’s recovery since his or her stroke. I will be asked to complete
questionnaires about myself and my significant other. I may also be asked to
complete some paper and pencil tasks and a computerized driving evaluation at
the School of Allied Health and Pharmacy. I am aware that the researchers may
be interviewing my significant other.
R isk s:
There are no expected risks from participating in this study.
Benefits:
There will be no direct benefit for me for taking part in this study. However, the
information may help more people who have sustained strokes resume the
activities they did before the stroke, including safe driving.
C o st of Participation:
There will be no additional cost to me or my insurance carrier for participation in
this study.
C om pensation:
I will be paid $25 when I complete the questionnaires. If I participate in the driving
simulator evaluation, I will be paid an additional $25. In the unlikely event of any
injury resulting from this research, no reimbursement, compensation, or free
medical treatment is offered by the Detroit Medical Center or Wayne State
University.
Voluntary Participation/W ithdraw al:
Taking part in this study is voluntary. I may choose not to take part in this study,
or if I decide to take part, I can later change my mind and withdraw from the
study. My decision will not change the present or future health care or other
services that I receive.
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Confidentiality:
All information that is collected for this study will be kept entirely confidential. I
will be identified in the research records by a code number. Information that
identifies me personally will not be released without my written permission. Any
presentation or publication based on the results from this study will not identify
me by name or otherwise.
Q uestio n s: If I have any questions regarding this study or my participation in it,
now or in the future, I can contact Dr. Lisa Rapport at (313) 577-2800 or Dr.
Renee Coleman at (313) 745-9763. If I have any questions regarding my rights
as a research subject, I can contact the Chair of the Behavioral Investigation
Committee at (313) 577-1628.
C o n se n t to Participate in R esearch Study: I have read or had read to me all of
the above information about this research study, including the research
procedure, possible risks, and the costs and benefits to me. The content and
meaning of this information was explained. All of my questions have been
answered to my satisfaction. I hereby consent and voluntarily offer to follow the
study requirements and take part in this study. I will receive a signed copy of this
consent form.

Signature of Study Subject

Date

Printed Name of Study Subject/Patient

Date

Signature of Legally Authorized Representative

Date

Relationship to Subject

Signature of Witness

Date

Signature of Investigator/Designee Obtaining Informed Consent

Date
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